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Prison Objectives and Human Dignity:
Reaching a Mutual Accommodation
Melvin Gutterman*
The mood and temper of the public
in regard to the treatment of crime
and criminals is one of the most unfailing
tests of the civilization of any country.
Winston Churchill, 1912'

Imprisonment as practiced in our country today is an
experiment in punishment and reformation that began about
200 years ago.%s a method of changing human behavior, it
has been a failure. There is an "endless, self-defeating cycle of
imprisonment, release, and reimprisonment which fails to alter
undesirable attitudes and beha~ior."~
Today, our criminal law dockets are full, our jails are
overcrowded, and almost every state is enlarging its
correctional facilities to accommodate more inmates. With more
than one million people behind bars, our highly civilized
country can now claim the dubious distinction of imprisoning
more of its citizens, per capita, than any other ~ o u n t r y . ~
*

Professor of Law, Emory University. B.A., 1959, University of Michigan; J.D.,
1962, Brooklyn Law School; L.L.M., 1967, Northwestern University.
I would like to thank my colleague, John Witte Jr., and my wife, Judy
Gutterman, for their many helpful suggestions in preparing this Article.
1. Quoted in Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594, 596-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
For an excellent general discussion on the early development of American
2.
THE DISCOVERY
OF THE ASYLUM 78-108 (1971),
prisons, see DAVID J . ROTHMAN,
and HARRY E. BARNES,THE REPRESSION
OF CRIME (1926).
3.
President Johnson's Message to Congress, 1 PUB. PAPERS
263, 264 (Mar. 8,
1965).
4.
A recent study by The Sentencing Project, a nonprofit research organization,
finds the American incarceration rate to be 426 people per 100,000, well in excess
of South Africa (333), the second-highest imprisonment rate, and the then Soviet
Union (268), the third in overall incarceration. The Nation: U.S. Leads in Share of
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The legal status of those persons convicted of committing a
criminal act was long ignored by the courts. A century ago, the
criminal offender was regarded as a "slave of the StateF5
thereby providing prison administrators' acts with virtual
immunity from judicial review. More recently, the courts took a
"hands-off"' approach to, the administration of prison^.^ The
loss of many of the most important basic rights in the
institutional setting was blithely accepted as a necessary
condition of rehabilitation, discipline, or security.
Today, with judicial prodding, prisons are beginning to
shed their "punitive heritage."' "[Tlhe soul-chilling inhumanity
of conditions in American prisons has been thrust upon the
The Supreme Court, although recognizing
judicial conscien~e."~
that prisoners are not wholly without protection of the
Constit~tion,~
has continually failed to honor all but the most
basic of human needs. The lower federal courts, however, have
emerged as the force behind the efforts to ameliorate inhumane
conditions in our prisons.1°
For the most part, federal judicial intervention has been
beneficial t o the correctional system and the broader
community.l 1 However, progress toward providing both

~esidplntsin Prison, ATLANTA
J. & CON^., Jan. 5, 1991, at A5.
I n 1988, the latest year for which figures are available, the Federal Bureau of
Justice Statistics indicated that about one million people were in prison or jails,
and that 2.3 million people were on probation. In the last decade, the population
of prisons had "increased by 45 percent while the number of those on probation
jumped by 75 percent." Stephen Labaton, Glutted Probation System Puts
Communities in Peril, N.Y. TIMES,June 19, 1990, at Al, A16.
Ruffm v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
5.
6.
For a historical review of the "hands-off theory, see Note, Beyond the Ken
of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts,
72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
7.
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 598 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting in
part, concurring in the result in part).
8.
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 684 (D.
Mass. 1973), afd, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Hall v. Inmates
of Suffolk County Jail, 419 U.S. 977 (1974).
Wolff, 418 U.S. a t 555-57.
9.
10.
See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 359 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurridg
in the judgment).
& DUDLEYD. SPILLER,JR., U.S. DEP'T
11. Id. at 359-60 (citing M. KAY HARRIS
OF J~JSTICE,AFTER DECISION: IMPLEMENTATION
OF JUDICIAL
DECREES IN
CORRECTIONAL
S ~ I N G2S1 (1977)).
Justice B r e ~ a nalso quotes prison officials who have acknowledged that
judicial intervention has helped them gain needed reform. Id. a t 360-61. For
example, the Commissioner of Corrections of New York City, stated: "Federal
courts may be the last resort for u s . . . . If there's going to be change, I think
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constitutional rights and humane conditions of confinement in
the nation's prisons has been slow and uneven despite this
pressure.
Prisoner litigation has posed a sharp choice between
respect for human dignity and the need for prison security.
Prison administrators have the difficult task of preserving
security in an explosive environment. To ensure that the courts
afford appropriate deference t o those charged with operating a
prison, the Supreme Court has decided that a prison regulation
is valid if it is "reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests"12 and does not represent "an exaggerated response
to those concerns."13
This Article in Part I1 explores the rise of the penitentiary
system in our country. Part I11 examines the development of
the Supreme Court's position on prisoners' rights and
conditions of confinement. Part IV elaborates on this
development under the Court's newly minted "reasonably
related" standard. Part V discusses the underlying reasons why
the Court counsels judicial restraint and deference t o the
judgment of prison administrations; nevertheless, this Article
argues that such judgment is often based on misplaced
assumptions of administrative expertise and an overly narrow
view of federalism and the separation of powers. Part VI
maintains that there is a need to reach a more realistic
"mutual accommodation between institutional needs and
objectives and the provisions of the Con~titution."'~
This Article contends that the Court's amorphous
"reasonableness" standard makes it too easy for prison officials
to restrict basic constitutional rights since they may be
the federal courts are going to have to force cities and states to spend more money
on their prisons . . . . I look on the courts as a friend." Id. at 360 (quoting
Stephen H. Gettinger, "CrueJ and Unusual" Prisons, 3 CORRECTIONS
IMAG., Dec.
1977, a t 3, 5).
Similarly, the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Corrections
testified before a congressional committee that lawsuits brought on behalf of prison
inmates have upgraded correctional institutions and the development of procedural
safeguards regarding basic constitutional rights. "There is no question in my mind
that had such court intervention not taken place, these fundamental improvements
would not have occurred." Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons: Hearings on S.
1393 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on tht?
Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 409 (1977) (prepared statement of K e ~ e t hF.
Schoen).
12. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
13. Id. at 87, 90.
14. Wolf'f v. McDonnell, 418 US. 539, 556 (1974).
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disregarded "whenever the imagination of the warden produces
a plausible security concern."15 The focus should be on the
impact of the constitutional deprivation on the inmate and the
availability of less restrictive, but reasonable, alternatives. The
guidepost should be to accord, whenever realistically possible,
respect for the human dignity of the prisoner.

A. Development of the Pennsylvania and Auburn
Prison Systems
Imprisonment as the most common method of punishment
for the commission of a crime is a relatively recent phenomenon. In late eighteenth century England, jails mainly held
debtors and those accused of committing crimes. Once convicted, corporal punishment, execution, or banishment were the
common forms of punishment. Incarceration was very rare.'"
Colonial America's treatment of prisoners was similar in
method to its European counterpart. Jails were primarily used
for holding debtors and those accused of crime.17 Punishment
consisted of public whipping, branding, carting, or displaying in
the pillories or stocks. For the more serious offenses, the offender might have been burned a t the stake, hanged, or banished.18
It was not until the latter half of the eighteenth century
that imprisonment in America supplanted corporal punishment
as the predominant means of dealing with the convicted criminal. J u s t prior to the outbreak of the Revolutionary War, the
State of P e ~ s y l v a n i abegan a n experiment that radically
changed the purpose of prisons. Led by Quaker reformists, the

Turner, 482 U.S. a t 100-01 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
15.
in part).
Leonard G. Leverson, Constitutional Limits on th4 Power to Restrict Access
16.
to Prisons: An Historical Re-Examination, 18 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 409, 412-13
SYSTEM
110-11 (1957);
(1983); see. also WINIFREDA. ELKIN, THE ENGLISHPENAL
IN MEDIEVAL
ENGLAND
(1968). "In early society,
RALPHB. PUGH, IMPRISONMENT
crimes against the public welfare were punished by summary execution," exile, or
corporal punishment, according to the nature of the crime and custom of the
group. BARNES,supra note 2, a t 156.
Jails were rarely used as a place of long-term confinement. At each session
17.
of the court, a "gaol delivery" emptied the jail of its inmates. Leverson, supra note
16, a t 412.
IN THE COLONY
See DOUGLASGREENBERG,
18.
CRIMEAND LAWENFORCEMENT
OF NEW YORK, 1691-1776, a t 223 (1974).
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Pennsylvania Assembly passed several statutes transforming
jails into penitentiaries. Richard Wistar, a member of the Society of Friends, was astonished by the misery of the inmates of
the provincial jail in Philadelphia. Some of the inmates had recently starved to death, so Wistar had soup prepared in his
house and distributed it to the inmates of the jail.lg Others
also became interested in the prison system and formed The
Philadelphia Society for Assisting Distressed prisoner^.^' Unfortunately, reform was delayed by the British occupation of
the city, which put a n end to the Society of Friends' activitiese2'
After the American Revolution, the publicity given to the
deplorable conditions in jail continued, promoting the formation
of The Philadelphia Society for Alleviating the Miseries of Public Prisons. This organization, the first of the modern prison
reform movements, set forth with clear and concise terms, i n
its preamble, the purpose of the society.
[Wlhen we reflect upon the miseries which penury, hunger,
cold, unnecessary severity, unwholesome apartments, and
guilt, (the usual attendants of prisons,) involve with them, it
becomes us to extend our compassion to that part of mankind,
who are the subjects of these miseries. By the aids of humanity, their undue and illegal sufferings may be prevented; the
links which should bind the whole family of mankind together, under all circumstances, be preserved unbroken; and such
degrees and modes of punishment may be discovered and
suggested, as may, instead of continuing habits of vice, become the means of restoring our fellow creatures to virtue and
happiness.22

Concurrent with concern for prison reform, a number of
prominent citizens of Philadelphia, led by Benjamin Franklin,
organized a movement for the reform of Pennsylvania's barbarous criminal code. By 1794, a systematic revision of the code
was completed, abolishing the death penalty for most crimes
and totally eliminating corporal punishment of any type. In its
place was substituted imprisonment as the normal sentence for

19.
BARNES,
supm note 2, at 97-98.
Id. at 98.
20.
Id.
21.
22.
AND SUCCESSIVE
EFFORTSTO
ROBERTSVAUX, NOTICESOF THE ORIGINAL,
AND TO REFORM
THE
IMPROVE
THE DISCIPLINE
OF THE PRISONOF PHILADELPHIA,
CRIMINAL
CODE OF PENNSYLVANIA 11 (1826).
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felons.23This break with colonial savagery of punishment necessitated the establishment of a prison system to house the
convicted.
In 1790, the first American penitentiary was established in
Philadelphia. The Pennsylvania General Assembly, responding
to the sentiments of Quaker-led reformists, passed a series of
laws to transform part of Philadelphia's Walnut Street Jail into
a ~ e n i t e n t i a r y The
. ~ ~ Jail was constructed to confine the worst
types of felons in solitary ~ o n f i n e m e n tThe
. ~ ~ program, soon to
become known as the "Pennsylvania system," provided that the
prisoner be kept in continuous isolation, with all communication forbidden, except for religious advisors and official visitors .26
The reformists envisioned a n institution where the convicted would ponder his crime in solitary confinement and in absolute silence. They believed that the penitentiary would provide
a place of penitence where the convict, alone in his cell with
only the Bible to comfort him, would necessarily "be compelled
to reflect on the error of his ways, to listen to the reproaches of
conscience, to the expostulations of religi~n.'~'Left in total
solitude with no evils to distract him, the prisoner would reflect
on his sins and repent. What the reformists actually hoped for
were penitentiary houses where kindness and proper direction
would enable the prisoner to begin his rehabilitation.
Presaging a modern-day problem, the Walnut Street Jail
proved a complete failure.28 The cells erected for the more
hardened criminals were insufficient to accommodate all inmates of this category and thus solitary confinement could not
be preserved. The Jail became so overcrowded that administration of the prison in the scientific manner thought necessary by
the Quakers became impossible.
This overcrowding led Pennsylvania to erect the Western
State Penitentiary near Pittsburgh in 1826 and the Eastern
State Penitentiary, outside of Philadelphia, in 1829. The

23.
BARNES,
supra note 2, at 101.
Id. at 102.
24.
Id.; see also PAULW. TAPPAN,CRIME,JUSTICEAND CORRECTION
605-06
25.
(1960).
26.
See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 598 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting in
part, concurring in the result in part).
27.
GEORGE
W. SMITH,A DEFENCE
OF THE SYSTEMOF SOLITARY
CONFINEMENT
OF PRISONERS
75 (1833).
28.
BARNES,
supra note 2, at 102.
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reformists were able to convince the legislature to enact their
fundamental vision of penal administration-solitary confinement and hard labor.29
The Pennsylvania program was lavishly praised by its
inspectors, affirming the wisdom of its reform supporters.
Shut out from a tumultuous world, and separated from those
equally guilty with himself, [the prisoner] can indulge his remorse unseen, and find ample opportunity for reflection and
reformation. His daily intercourse is with good men, who, in
administering to his necessities, animate his crushed hopes,
and pour into his ear the oil of joy and consolation. He has
abundance of light, air, and warmth; he has good and wholesome food; he has seasonable and comfortable clothing; he has
the best of medical attendance; he has books to read, and ink
and paper to communicate with his friends a t stated periods;
and weekly he enjoys the privilege of hearing God's holy word
expounded by a faithful and zealous Christian minister."

The Pennsylvania system was the precursor of other state
reform movement^.^' The Philadelphia Society had taken the
lead and had widely advertised its program. Determined to
make its influence on prison reform felt nationwide, the Society
corresponded extensively with executives of several states and
widely distributed information about its program.32
It was only natural that Pennsylvania's progress caught
the attention of New York's Governor John Jay, and that in his
first message to the legislature, the chief executive recommended the reform of the New York criminal code.33 Convinced that
Pennsylvania had provided the desirable model, the New York
legislature passed an act that, like its sister state, substantially
reduced the list of capital crimes and substituted imprisonment
for corporal punishment?
Newgate Prison, built i n New York's Greenwich Village,
was opened in 1797 to accommodate inmates. Like its counter, Newgate Prison rapidly became overpart in P e ~ s y l v a n i athe
29.
1829 Pa. Laws 351-54.
supra note 2, at 104 (quoting Report of the Inspectors of the West30.
BARNES,
ern Penitentiary, Legislative Documents 271 (1854)).
31.
Cf. ORLANDO F. LEWIS,THEDEVELOPMENT
OF AMERICAN PRISONS AND PRISON CUSTOMS,
1776-1845, at 206-07 (reprinted with the cooperation of The Correctional Association of New York, Patterson Smith 1967) (1922).
32.
VAUX, supra note 22, at 34.
33.
BARNES,supra note 2, at 105-06.
34.
Id.
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crowded,35requiring the construction of a new state prison in
Auburn, New York. After a period of experimenting with the
Pennsylvania system of total solitary confinement, Auburn
adopted the congregate method of confinement. This change
entailed nothing more than allowing the convicts to work together by day, with separation at night, but enforced silence a t
all times. Nevertheless, this change proved to be historically
significant.
A virulent debate arose between the advocates of the Auburn and Pennsylvania systems which raged with intensity
over several decades.36 In addition, several European countries became interested and sent their official investigators to
evaluate the new experimental prison^.^'
Solitary confinement was the essential feature of the Pennsylvania scheme. The key to reforming the convict lay in separating him from evil influences and corrupt companions.
"Blindfolded upon arrival, he was led to his cell where the
blindfold was rem~ved."~The solitary cell, large and well
ventilated, and its small exercise yard, were his entire world.
When the time came for his release he was blindfolded again
and led out.3g The Pennsylvania supporters argued that prisoners confined to their cells at all times did not have to be
shepherded t o meals or supervised in workshops; therefore
guards would not have to be well trained, for their contact with
these inmates would be minimal. The whip would rarely have
to be used since prisoners in isolation have few opportunities to
violate regulations. Furthermore, security was easy to maintain, since isolated inmates would find it M i c u l t to formulate

35.
Id. at 106-07. A practice similar to that in effect in our overcrowded prisons was inaugurated. Each year as many convicts as admitted were pardoned in
order to keep the prison population down to a reasonable number. Id. at 107.
ROTHMAN,
supra note 2, a t 81-83. See BARNES,supra note 2, at 114 11.55,
36.
for a comprehensive list of articles and pamphlets defending and condemning the
Pennsylvania system.
37.
BARNES,supm note 2, a t 163. France dispatched Alexis de Tocqueville and
Gustave Auguste de Beaumont; England sent Sir William Crawford; Prussia sent
Dr. Nicholas H. Julius. Many wrote invaluable essays on their experiences. See,
e.g., GLJSTAVE
A. DE BEAUMONT
& ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,
ON THE PENITENTIARY
SYSTEM IN THE UNITEDSTATESAND ITS APPLICATION
IN FRANCE(Herman R. Lantz
ed., Francis Lieber trans., S. 111. U. Press 1964) (1833).
38.
NEW YORK STATE SPECIALCOMMISSION
ON ATTICA,A ~ I C ATHE
:
OFFICIAL
ON ATTICA7 (1972) [hereinREPORTOF THE NEW YORKSTATESPECIALCOMMISSION
after ATTICA].
39.
Id.
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escape plans.40
The Auburn school countered that it was unnatural to
leave inmates in solitary confinement for years at a time. They
argued that total isolation was "at variance with the human
con~titution."~~
Minds broke under the strain of idle isolation.
Far from reforming men, the practice contributed to insanity
and bred despair. Of equal importance, by permitting convicts
to work together in silent harmony, they could feel the satisfaction of hard work and contribute to the cost of their incarceration. Besides, the Pennsylvania system was more expensive to
establish. The Auburn cells were smaller since they were primarily for sleeping, and not intended to encompass the
convicts' entire universe. Aided by the growing recognition that
it was economically cheaper to construct and maintain prisons
under the Auburn plan, it eventually triumphed and became
the dominant model for American prisons.42
The war between the two camps had dominated all thinking on corrections. In retrospect, it is hard to fathom the depth
of the debate and to understand why it became so passionate.
The main objective of both the Pennsylvania and Auburn systems was to deprive the convict of personal autonomy. Rules
were designed to control his behavior in every detail. His every
movement from waking to sleeping was monitored and controlled.43 Both programs placed maximum emphasis on isolation in the prison and the establishment of a disciplined routine. In both, the inmate was kept in a separate cell a t night
and subject to the rule of absolute silence a t all times. The
focus was on the one difference rather than on the similarities
of the two systems. The primary innovation of the congregate
Auburn system was that inmates worked together during the
day.
The narrowness of the content of the debate clearly indicated that there was widespread agreement on the institutional
process. As one prison became overcrowded, another
fortress-like institution was built. In New York, in 1825, Auburn prisoners helped build Sing Sing on the Hudson River,

supra note 2, at 86.
ROTHMAN,
Id. at 87.
supra note 2, at 163-65.
BARNES,
43.
See generally Richard G. Singer, Privacy, Autonomy, and Dignity in Prison:
A Preliminary Inquiry Concerning Constitutional Aspects of t h Degradation Process
in Our Prisons, 21 BUFF.L. REV.669 (1972).
40.
41.
42.
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and in 1844, the construction of the Clinton Prison was authori~ed.'~No one questioned the shared basic premise of the
Pennsylvania and Auburn systems: incarceration was the best
societal response t o criminal behavior.
While those guilty of lesser crimes served their time in
local jails, the penitentiaries, from the beginning, housed the
most violent criminals with the longest prison sentences. But
prison wardens found it difficult t o morally reform hardened
inmates who would spend most of their lives behind prison
walls. Confronted with the problem of coping with the unruly
prisoner, most wardens reverted t o the practice of whipping
and chaining. The very punishments that penitentiaries were
originated to eliminate were now widely used. An impenetrable
wall of silence between the convict and warden emerged. Facing years of incarceration, the prisoners became uncooperative,
forcing the wardens to increasingly devote their energy to
maintaining peace and security within their institution^.^^
The Pennsylvania scheme provided for a rigorous system of
inspection of the ~ e n i t e n t i a r y To
. ~ ~the reformers, inspection
was of utmost importance to discover and redress abuse^.^'
The Auburn plan also agreed upon and provided for inspectioa4' But official inspection proved an uncertain check on the
Legislative commissions and
defects in the penitentiarie~.~~
official visitors were unable t o quell abuses?' A chairman of
the Board of Inspections wrote that although he frequently
visited Sing Sing, a New York prison, and gave its affairs close
inspection, "[ilt was so easy for the officers to conceal even from
me, with all my attention and vigilance, their abuses of authority and wanton cruelty.'"'
When the inmate population increased and became more
violent, the wardens lost patience with reform. As they loosened their insistence on silence and separation, security became a problem. More energy was spent on administration of

44.
A~ICA
,
supra
note 38, at 11.
45.
supra note 2, at 249-51.
ROTHMAN,
46.
Leverson, supra note 16, at 416.
Id.
47.
48.
Other penitentiaries in Alabama, Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Vermont also recognized the wisdom of omcia1 inspections. See Leverson, supra note 16, at 417-18.
Id. at 418.
49.
Id. at 420.
50.
51.
See PHILIP KLEIN,PRISON METHODSIN NEW YORKSTATE361 (1969).
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the penitentiary than on rehabilitation. There was also widespread prison mismanagement and cruelty. Within a few years,
several wardens in Auburn were forced t o resign because of
their harsh treatment and neglect of their charges.52The debate no longer centered upon whether incarceration would
reform the inmate, but rather on the extent of prison corr ~ p t i o n .There
~ ~ began a self-perpetuating period of decline
with a diminishing attraction for both systems.

B. The Reformatory Movement-The Elmira Experiment
By 1860, the penitentiaries had lost their rehabilitative
purpose; nevertheless they still continued to be the principal
means of criminal punishment. Where influential reformists
had once marveled at the massive penitentiaries, those who
now took their first look at these institutions were clearly disappointed. Two leading American penologists, E.C. Wines and
Theodore Dwight, prepared a widely read report asserting that
the prisons no longer made rehabilitation the central goal.54
They declared that "there is not a state prison in America in
which the reformation of the convicts is the one supreme object
of the discipline, t o which everything else is made to bend.'"5
These new reformists had little respect for the Pennsylvania
and Auburn principles. As Wines and Dwight observed, conversations between inmates are beneficial since sociability is "a
fountain of moral strength in civil life."56 They also criticized
the rigidity of prison routine, observing that "what we want is
to gain the will, the consent, the cooperation of these men, not
t o mould them into so many pieces of ma~hinery."~'
The new reformists wanted the convicts, with appropriate
supervision, to reenter society as quickly as possible. They
promulgated the original idea of the indeterminate sentence
which, according to Wines, "gave t o the whole a wonderful
vitality."58 They promoted, at fist, the commutation of sen-

w.

52.
See
DAVISLEWIS,FROMNEWGATE
TO DANNEMORA:
THE RISE OF THE
PENITENTIARYNEW YORK, 1796-1848, at 208-09 (1965); Leverson, supra note 16,
at 426.
53.
ROTHMAN,
supra note 2, at 242.
54.
ENOCHC. WINES& THEODORE
W. DWIGHT,REPORT ON THE PRISONSAND
287 (1867).
REFORMATORIES
OF THE UNITEDSTATES AND CANADA
Id.
55.
56.
Id. at 179.
Id. at 181.
57.
58.
John P. Conrad, Correctional Treatment, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF CRIMEAND
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tence for good behavior, and then advocated probation and
parole to further shorten the period of incarceration. Additionally, they urged the states to create agencies for the aftercare
of released prisoners.59Moreover, they demanded a separate
institution for young first offenders and another for more dangerous criminals. Segregating the minority that caused the
most trouble, they believed, provided greater flexibility in prison admini~tration.~~
Although these new views added substantially to the chsillusionment with the Auburn and Pennsylvania systems, Wines
and Dwight never attracted a wide following. In 1877, however,
they were able to initiate their progressive reforms at an institution in Elmira, New York, but only for the treatment of
young first offenders? Their theories were rarely introduced
into the prisons which confined the older adult offenders and
were therefore not applied to the mass of the country's prison
p~pulation.~~
The Elmira Reformatory, like its predecessors, became
world famous. Penologists from many countries came to study
its methods and operation. These visitors no longer saw inmates in striped uniforms, with shaven heads, moving in silent
lockstep, as prevailed in other prisons at that time.63 The
Elmira regimen was an active one. There were hours of military drill and dress parades. Vocational training and educational programs, including moral and religious instruction, occupied the days of its inmate^.^
The great advance of the reformatory system was that the
term of incarceration now partially depended upon the
prisoner's discernable progress toward reform. Its advocates
stressed reformation rather than retribution. But the practice
of good reformatory administration at that time required secure
custody and permitted the superintendent wide discretionary

JI.J~IC!E
270 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983).
59.
ROTHMAN,
supra note 2, at 252.
Id.
60.
61.
See BARNES,
supra note 2, at 167-68. .
62.
Id. at 168. "States were slow to establish parole and probation systems, and
even less inclined to construct separate institutions for different offenders."
ROTHMAN,
supra note 2, at 252. "Before the end of the century twelve states had
built facilities on the Elmira model, and by 1933 there were eleven more." Conrad,
supra note 58, at 270.
THOUSAND
YEARSIN SINGSING35 (1932).
63.
LEWISE. LAWES,TWENTY
See generally ZEBULON R. BROCKWAY,
F
I YEARS
~
OF PRISONSERVICE
64.
(1912).
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powers, with no outside interference. The convict was to have
no rights. His entire life was to be directed-all his waking
hours, activities, and bodily and mental habits to be controlled.65
While Elmira had the important elements of reform, it
failed to provide the right sort of psychological surroundings to
implement its objectives. There was no grasp of the fundamental fact that a prisoner, to be prepared for a life of freedom,
must be trained in some sort of social environment, which, as
to his liberty and responsibility, has a fair resemblance to the
society that he will reenter. There was no general recognition
that the criminal must be dealt with as a n individual, to assist
him to lead a good and useful life on discharge. There was no
encouragement to develop restraint born of character and responsibility. Basically, there was no attempt to develop in the
prisoner a measure of self-development.
Far from a vast improvement, the Elmira system "was
repressive and varied from benevolent despotism in the best
instances, to tyrannical cruelty in the
It was built on
the same architectural principle as Auburn, but with "more
drastic rules [for] punishment and ~bedience."~Though nominally a reformatory, in actuality it was a prison.68 At Elmira,
the ages of admission ranged from 16 to 30, which prompted a n
English authority to remark that the trouble with the Reformatory idea was "that it made youths out of adults and adults out
of youths, subjecting both to all the odious and cruel
oppressions that prevailed in prison^."^"
Zebulon R. Brockway, a founder of the reformatory idea
and the first superintendent of Elmira, ruled with a n iron fist.
He brought with him many of the features of adult prisons.
Brockway's repressive administration led to many abuses, and
when The New York World in 1900 published accounts of brutality within the Reformatory, he was forced to resiga7'
Because of the above-mentioned failures, by the turn of the
century, reformation no longer appeared to be the lodestar of
incarceration. The new reformers were dissatisfied with peni-

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

LAWES,supra note 63, at 37.
BARNES,supra note 2, at 168.
LAWES,supra note 63, at 37.

Id.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 38.
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tentiaries but had attracted little support to narrow the gap
between society and the imprisoned. The massive, fortress-like
penitentiaries were, after all, still ready to receive the next
generation of convicts. The custodial nature of the penitentiary,
as its sole benefit, appeared satisfactory to prison officials,
state legislators, and the ordinary citizen.?'
' Dark and Evil World"-The Arkansas Experience
C. !A
The reformists' dream of an enlightened era in prison
treatment had failed to flower. By the early 1900s, the concept
of reformation had practically disappeared and, for the most
part, the penitentiary served a purely custodial function as a
warehouse for the c~nvicted.?~
Historically, the judiciary played no role in supervising the
conditions in the prisons or any of the procedures employed in
its administration. A prisoner was conceived as "the slave of
the State,"73 and the courts were reluctant to become immersed in prison operations. The universal wisdom was that
the judiciary had no power to interfere with the jailer's discretion regarding the treatment and security of his charge^.?^
"Hands-off' was the clear order of the time. With virtual
unanimity, the courts decided that they neither had the power,
nor was it their function, to supervise prison^.?^ The "handsoff' doctrine was also supported by the legal theory distinguishing between rights and privilege~.~"ights, of course, were
basic and afforded the utmost protection requiring judicial
scrutiny. The courts, however, confirmed the warden's discretion to label various features of prison existence as privileges,
which were simply grants from him that could be restricted or
withdrawn a t will.?? By marking all forms of prison life as
privileges, the warden denied the prisoner a judicial forum.78
71.
ROTHMAN,
supra note 2, at 255.
Id.
72.
73.
Ruffm v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
See generally Note, supra note 6.
74.
75.
See, e.g., Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 US.
859 (1954).
See generally William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege
76.
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
See, e g . , Parks v. Ciccone, 281 F. Supp. 805 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (use of
77.
typewriter); Childs v. Pegelow 321 F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
932 (1964) (religious practices).
78.
A few &urts, however, departed from the "hands-off" doctrine and adopted
a counterprinciple that "[a] prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen
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However, in the late 1960s the "dark and evil world" of the
penitentiary was finally exposed to a courageous federal district judge in Arkansas and subsequently to the nation.7gThe
Arkansas prisoners initiated an unprecedented judicial attack
on the State's archaic penitentiary system. What Chief Judge
Henley learned about the Cummins Farm Unit and the Tucker
Reformatory was "completely alien to the free world."80 Inmates were tortured by electrical shocks and beaten with leather straps. Faced with the threat of death, they were forced to
work ten hours a day, six days a week, sometimes in inclement
weather and without adequate clothing. Trusty "inmate
guard^,"^' with the power over life and death, supervised the
daily routine of the prison.82Trying to escape forcible sexual
violence and stabbings, the inmates in the barracks would
"cling to the bars" all night.83A sentence in the Arkansas penitentiary amounted to "banishment from civilized society" t o a
damnable place.84
Faced with these degrading conditions, Chief Judge Henley
turned to the "cruel and unusual punishment" clause of the
Eighth Amendment and found a constitutional violation in the
climate of fear and hatred produced through the brutal and
capricious exercise of power by the trusties.
It is one thing for the State to send a man to the Penitentiary
as a punishment for crime. I t is another thing for the State to
delegate the governance of him to other convicts, and to do
nothing meaningful for his safety, well being, and possible
rehabilitation. . . .
However constitutionally tolerable the Arkansas system

except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him by law." Coffin
v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944); see also Pierce v. La Vallee, 293
F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961); Fulwood v. Clemmer, 295 F.2d 171 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
79.
Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 381 (E.D. Ark. 1970), affd, 442 F.2d 304
(8th Cir. 1971). For a graphic visual depiction of the Arkansas Penal System, see
(20th Century Fox 1980).
the movie BR~JBAKER
80.
Holt, 309 F. Supp. at 381.
81.
A trusty inmate guard is an inmate with administrative responsibilities. For
a general discussion, see id. a t 373-76.
82.
"It is within the power of a trusty guard to murder another inmate with
practical impunity, and the danger that such will be done is always clear and
present." Id. at 374.
83.
Id. at 377.
84.
Id. a t 381. Even today, remnants of the brutal power exercised by trusties
and condoned by prison officials survive. See Ark Press, Inside America's Toughest
Oct. 6, 1986, a t 46 (gripping story of the overcrowded condiPrison, NEWSWEEK,
tions and brutal treatment of inmates in the Texas prison system).
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may have been in former years, it simply will not do today . . . .85

Prior to the prison litigation, the people of Arkansas "knew
little or nothing about their penal system" despite "sporadic
and sensational 'exposes.' "86 The Arkansas experience became
the new rallying point in prison reform. The myth that prisoners were treated humanely could no longer be maintained.
The Arkansas system proved to be neither an anachronism
nor a n aberration. Atrocities and mismanagement in other
state prisons began to surface." The lid was off. Our highest
Court had not as yet directly faced the prison problems being
played out in the lower courts,8' but the time to do so was
clearly a t hand."

A. Wolff v. McDo~ell-Development of Procedural
Due Process in Correctional Facilities
Discipline was regarded as the key to success in the Auburn program. As the method to enforce discipline, the rule of

-

85.
Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 381 (E.D. Ark. 1970), afd, 442 F.2d 304
(8th Cir. 1971).
Id. a t 367.
86.
87.
See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974); Ruiz v. Estelle,
503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980), motion to stay granted in part, denied in part,
650 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1981), afd in part, rev'd in part, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93
(N.D. Ohio), supplemented by 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), afrd sub nom.
Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972). See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
, concurring in the judgment), for a list of prison
337, 353 n.1 (1981) ( B r e ~ a n J.,
systems that had, by 1980, been declared unconstitutional under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
88.
While prisoners' rights litigation began to flourish in the lower courts, for
the most part the Supreme Court, which under Chief Justice Warren's leadership
had greatly expanded the rights of those accused of crime, basically ignored the
next step: guarding the constitutional rights of those confined in prison. However,
as the Court became more familiar with prisoners' claims, it prohibited the states
from hindering prisoner access t o the courts and thereby chipped away a t the
"hands-off" doctrine. See, cg., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969). By the early
1970s, the Court had reviewed several prison regulations that focused on the scope
of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights in prison. See, e g . , Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817 (1974); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405
U.S. 319 (1972).
89.
See Hutto v. F i ~ e y ,437 U.S. 678 (1978), where the Court affirmed the
findings and remedial orders of the district court and Eighth Circuit in the Arkansas prison decisions.
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silence emerged as the most awesome feature of the penitentiary. After their tour through the Auburn prison, the French
visitors Beaumont and Tocqueville wrote: "[Wle felt as if we
traversed catacombs; there were a thousand living beings, and
yet it was a desert solitude."g0
The guards watching the movement of large numbers of
inmates shuffling silently across the prison in lockstep could
easily spot any unauthorized conversation or activity. For any
infraction, the convict was swiftly punished. The whip was
most common. Solitary confinement in a barren cell with one
meal per day was soon introduced. Water "cures," stocks, and
sweatboxes became widely used. These forms of punishment
continued well into the middle 1 9 0 0 ~ The
. ~ ~ wisdom of the
time was that discipline was strictly a matter for prison administrator~.~~
Against this backdrop, in Wolf v. McDonnellg3 the Court
took its first crucial step into modern-day prison reform. Wolf
involved a prisoner's interest in maintaining the "good-time
credit" he had accrued. As it examined a prison disciplinary
proceeding that took place in a "closed, tightly controlled envir ~ n m e n t , "the
~ ~Court sought to design a structure that would
accord procedural due process to a n inmate. The Supreme
Court forcibly declared that "a prisoner is not wholly stripped
~~
of constitutional protections when he is i m p r i ~ o n e d . "There
was to be "no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and
the prisons of this ~ountry.'"~The Wolff majority wisely proclaimed that although confinement may diminish specific constitutional guarantees, including Fourteenth Amendment freedoms, "a mutual accommodation between institutional needs
and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution" must be struckg7
90.
BEALJMONT
& TOCQUEVILLE,
supra note 37, at 65.
91.
AWICA,supra note 38, at 11. As the Arkansas experience demonstrated,
brutality and torture by guards (and fellow prisoners) became commonplace in
prison. See supra notes 79-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Arkansas experience.
92.
The Warren Court did little in this area. Two notable exceptions were
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (permitting inmates to use "jailhouse lawyers" when the state failed to provide adequate legal assistance), and Mempa v.
Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (applying procedural due process requirements to the
probation revocation process).
93.
418 U.S. 539 (1974).
Id. at 561.
94.
Id. at 555.
95.
Id. at 555-56.
96.
Id. at 556.
97.
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Wolff rejected the State's assertion that a prisoner's interest "in disciplinary procedures is not included in that 'liberty'
protected" by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
A~nendment.~~
The State itself created the right t o good-time
credit toward early release fkom prison and recognized that its
deprivation could only be sanctioned by major misconduct. The
prisoner's interest, therefore, had real substance that sufficiently placed him within the pale of Fourteenth Amendment
"liberty" and entitled him to minimum procedural due process." The Wolf Court believed that a person's "liberty" is
equally protected when it is a statutory creation of the State,
and under these circumstances, "[tlhe touchstone of due process
is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government."'
Prior t o Wolff, state prison officials were able t o take away
good-time credits after "serious misconduct" was shown in a
nonadversarial hearing.lO' Wolf determined that before state
prisoners could lose good-time credits, minimum procedural
safeguards required that they receive "advance written notice
of the claimed violation and a written statement of the
factfinders as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for
the disciplinary action taken."lo2Furthermore, prisoners were
permitted, when not unduly hazardous t o institutional safety or
goals, to call witnesses and to present documentary evidence in
their defense.lo3
The "mutual accommodation" model did not, however,
Id. at 556-57. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pro98.
vides that a State cannot "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
.
XIV, $ 1.
due process of law." U.S. C o ~ s r amend.
99.
418 US. at 557.
100. Id. at 558.
101. Id. at 546, 548-53 n.8. The prisoners in Wolff argued for the same
protections required in parole and probation revocation hearings included in
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778
(1973). In Morrissty, the Court required that procedural safeguards at parole revocation include written notice of the alleged violations, disclosure of damaging evidence, an opportunity to be heard and "to present witnesses and documentary
evidence," "the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses" (unless good
cause for disallowing is shown), "a 'neutral and detached' hearing body," and "a
written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for
revoking parole." Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489. In Gagnon, the Court applied the
Morrissg, standards to probation revocation hearings, and further held that due
process requires the appointment of counsel for the hearings when it is fundamentally necessary. Cmgnon, 411 U.S. at 783-91.
102.
Wolff, 418 U.S. a t 563.
103. Id. at 566.
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include the rights to confrontation, cross-examination, o r the
appointment of counsel. These procedural rights were thought
to present serious hazards t o institutional interests and were
not perceived as requiring constitutional protection in the prison setting. The Court accepted the State's position that it
would not be wise to encase disciplinary procedures in an "inflexible constitutional straitjacket" that requires adversary
proceedings typical of a criminal trial?" Doing so would very
likely raise the confrontational level between the staff and
their charges and undermine the "utilization of the disciplinary
process as a tool to advance the rehabilitative goals of the institution."lo5The Court noted that as penal institutions change
and correctional goals are altered, the balance of interests may
be re~haped.'~"or now, when security dangers are involved,
the better practice, "in a period where prison practices are diverse and somewhat experimental, is to leave these matters to
the sound discretion of the officials of state
Wolf revealed that, in striking a "mutual accommodation,"
deference t o the sound discretion of state officials was to play
the decisive role.lo8But by refusing t o accept the established
prison procedures, the Court discarded permanently the
"hands-off' theory, inaugurating a new period in which the
Court became a critical player.
Wolf, however, was criticized as a glancing blow to the
prison-rights movement. Of course, many prisoners "have [very]
little regard for the safety of others" or the qegulations "designed to provide an orderly and reasonably safe prison [envir ~ n m e n t ] . " ' ~But
~ without the right to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses, an inmate facing disciplinary
proceedings was afforded little means to challenge the word of
his accusers. lo The deference accorded prison officials appeared to leave the inmate no remedy against a board intent on

104.
Id. at 563.
105. Id.
106.
Id. at 568.
107.
Id. at 569. Justice Marshall would have extended to prisoners those minimum requirements of due process required in parole revocation hearings as set out
in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 US. 471, 489 (1972). These would include the right to
call witnesses and present documentary evidence, as well as the right to confront
and cross-examine adverse witnesses. WolK 418 U.S. at 581-82 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
108.
418 US. at 569.
Id. at 562.
109.
110.
Id. at 582 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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restricting rights in the name of "institutional safety.""' The
right to call witnesses and present documentary evidence appeared unenforceable when left to the unchecked discretion of
prison officials.
Wolff had not considered the best way to accommodate the
inmate's right to call witnesses. If the cbsciplinary board was
required to provide on the record (not necessarily available to
the inmate) a contemporaneous written explanation for exclusion of an inmate's witness, it would have gone far toward
assuring the board's decision was based on permissible factors.
But when faced with this option in Ponte v. Real," the Court
once again opted for Wolfs vaguely defined "correctional goal"
of "swift di~cipline.""~The Court held that prison officials
must explain their reason at some time, but "they may do so
either by making the explanation a part of the 'administrative
record' in the disciplinary proceeding, or by presenting testimony in court."l14 By permitting a postponement of a reasonable
explanation, Real left the inmates' constitutional rights to present evidence "dangling in the wind."l15
closed the door to disciSuperintendent u. Hill""nally
plinary procedural due process by declaring that if there is any
evidence in the record that supports the conclusion reached by
the disciplinary board, then the tribunal's decision is constitutionally acceptable.l17 Meeting this standard does not require
a n examination of the entire record, independent assessment of
the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence."'
Perhaps, viewed from the inmate's eye, the one-sidedness
of the disciplinary hearings becomes clearer.
[Ilf I were to describe how they seem to a stranger, I would
call them "pretend trialsy'-with the concept of "proving"guilt
only make-believe. . . . [Tlhe process is not impartial, nor is
guilt or innocence the issue. Guilt is an a priori assumption.

"'

Id. at 593 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part, concurring in the result in part).
471 US. 491 (1985).
Id. at 495.
Id. at 497.
Id. at 522 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
472 US. 445 (1985).
Id. at 457.
Id. at 455.
KATHRYNW. BURKHART,
WOMENIN PRISON147 (1973).
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As one administrator bluntly put it: . . .
"A woman can speak on her own behalf and try to convince us she's telling the truth, but we know what really happened."
Inmates say the process is one-sided from the get-go. . . .
The woman is not allowed to call witnesses in her behalf. And
the board is not required to give a decision based on evidence.
"It's your word against hers," said one woman who had
been in solitary confinement for a week when I met her.
"She's always going to win because they're her people, they're
going to listen to her. You're just a number or a blank space
in their minds. You go in and sit in front of that board and
you know you don't have a chance in heaven to get out of
going to solitary."120

Wolfs dissenters had not discounted the concerns prison
officials had in maintaining prison security and understood
that they were real and important; but they stressed that there
was great danger in deferring to the "unreviewable discretion
As Justice Douglas vigorously inof prison a~thorities."'~~
sisted, regarding due process issues, the Court "should no more
place the inmate's constitutional rights in the hands of the
prison administration's discretion than . . . place the
defendant's right in the hands of the prose~utor."'~But,
Wolf and its progeny may have done just that.

B. From Meachum toHarper-Liberty Interest Originating
in the Fourteenth Amendment
The liberty interest protected by Wolf had its origins in
state law. A prisoner's interest in maintaining his good-time
credits had real substance and was thus sufficiently embraced
within Fourteenth Amendment liberty. Wolf recognized that
under these circumstances, minimum procedures were required
by the Due Process Clause "to insure that the state-created
right [was] not arbitrarily abr~gated."'~
Wolff tied its entitlement analysis to the state-created
provisions, but implied that this was not essential to its holding. Two years after Wolff was decided, the Court was asked to

120.
Id. at 147-48.
121.
Wolff v. M c D o ~ e l l ,418 U.S. 539, 601 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting in
part, concurring in the result in part).
122. Id. at 600-01.
Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557.
123.
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determine whether its conception of liberty applied when the
claimed right did not have its roots in state law. The key issue
in Meachum v. FanolZ4was whether a state prisoner could be
transferred to a prison that is substantially more restrictive,
absent a fact-finding hearing of alleged misc~nduct.'~~
At the
outset, the Court rejected "the notion that any grievous loss
visited upon a person by the State is sufficient t o invoke the
procedural protections of the Due Process C l a u ~ e . " ' ~ ~ h e
prisoner's conviction had sufficiently extinguished his liberty to
permit the State to confine him in any of its prisons.127The
state law conferred no right on the prisoner to remain in the
prison to which he was initially confined, and whatever expectation the prisoner may have had is "too ephemeral and insubstantial to trigger procedural due process protection^."'^^ In
short, WoIfPs reasoning regarding hearings for good-time credit
revocations and prison disciplinary confinement did not apply
to prison transfers (even those sparked by alleged misconduct),
and thus prison officials have unfettered discretion to transfer
prisoners for any reason or for no reason at
The net result of Meachum appeared to be that conviction
and imprisonment extinguished a prisoner's liberty and that he
could not gain any substantive protection from the bare wording of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. A clear
signal was sent to the states that enabled them to forestall the
development of liberty interests, at least when no state law or
specific constitutional provision provided otherwise. As long as

124.
427 U.S. 215 (1976).
125. Id. at 216. The transfers occurred when, after a period of unrest at the
Massachusetts Correctional Institution a t Norfolk, several fires erupted that officials suspected the inmates had set. The corrections authorities, after reviewing the
classification board's recommendations, transferred six inmates to the Walpole and
Bridgewater facilities where living conditions were "substantially more adverse"
than at Norfolk. Fano v. Meachum, 387 F. Supp. 664, 665-67 (D. Mass.), affd, 520
F.2d 374 (1st Cir. 1975), reu'd, 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
126.
427 U.S. at 224. See Susan N. Herman, T h New Liberty: The Procedural
Due Process Rights of Prisoners and Others Under the Burger Court, 59 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 482 (1984), for a comprehensive study of the positivist theory of "property"
and "liberty."
127.
427 U.S. at 224.
128. Id. at 228.
129. Id. The Court distinguished Wotff in that "[tlhe liberty interest protected in
Wolff had its roots in state law, and the minimum procedures required there were
to protect a state-created right." Id. a t 226. In Meachum, "[tlhe predicate for invoking the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment as construed and applied in Wolff
v. M c D o ~ e l is
l totally nonexistent." Id. at 227.
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the conditions of confinement were within the sentence imposed and did not otherwise violate the Constitution, the Due
Process Clause did not alone subject the prisoner's treatment
by prison authorities to judicial oversight.lgOThe Court refused to delineate a hierarchy of significant interests; rather its
methodology was to closely examine the language of the relevant statutes and regulations t o determine if there was a statecreated substantive liberty interest.13' The State could create
enforceable liberty interests in the prison setting " 'by placing
substantive limitations on official discretion.' "13" Furthermore, "the use of 'explicit mandatory language' " that establishes "substantive predicates" to govern official decision making
limits discretion and will force the Court to conclude that "the
State ha[d] created a liberty interest."ls3
Justice Stevens, dissenting in Meachun, was disturbed by
the majority's pinched constitutional conception of liberty. To
him, it was self-evident that the correct source of liberty protected by the Constitution was the natural law, that all men
are endowed by their creator with liberty as a cardinal, inalienable right. It is this basic freedom which due process protects,
rather than "particular rights or privileges conferred by specific
laws or regulation^."'^^ For Justice Stevens, it "demeans the
concept of liberty itself-to ascribe to [it] nothing more than
the protection of an interest that the State had created through
its own [laws or] prison regulation^."'^^ To him, it was clear
that "the inmate retains an unalienable interest in liberty-at
the very minimum the right to be treated with dignity-which
the Constitution may never ignore."ls6 Trying to identify the
residuum of liberty that the prisoner retained in the prison
environment was understandably a difficult task. Justice
Stevens was convinced, however, that at a minimum, an inmate "has a protected right to pursue his limited rehabilitative

130. Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976).
131.
In Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S.454, 459-63 (1989),
Justice Blackmun summarized the Court's history of liberties protected by due
process. See infra text accompanying notes 263-68 for a discussion of Thompson.
132.
Id. at 462 (quoting Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983)).
133. Id. at 463 (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S.460, 470-72 (1983) (holding
that a regulation that employed unmistakably mandatory language, such as "shall,"
"will," or "must," creates a protected liberty interest)). See infia note 140 for a
discussion of Hewitt.
134.
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 233.
Id.
136.
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goals" and "to maintain whatever attributes of dignity" he can
as a n inmate in a "tightly controlled society."137
The debate on whether prisoners have liberty interests
beyond those based on state law occupied the Court as it
sought to develop the implications of M e a ~ h u r n . ' At
~ ~ times,
some members of the Court tried to blur the bright line of
M e a ~ h u m , ' only
~ ~ to subsequently have the Court reaffirm
Meachum's theory. 140
Finally, in Vitek v. Jones,l4l the Court gave the clearest
evidence that it would find substantive due process rights in
the prison context apart from state-created rights. In Vitek, the
Court left no doubt that a state prisoner does possess a significant Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in avoiding involuntary transfer to a mental hospital. The stigma attached to a
transfer to a mental hospital for involuntary psychiatric treatment, coupled with subjecting the inmate to "mandatory behavior modification as a treatment for mental illness," required

137.
Id. at 234.
138. See Barry R. Bell, Note, Prisoners' Rights. Institutional Needs, and the Burger Court, 72 VA. L. REV. 161, 171-81 (1986).
139.
See, e g . , Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981).
Justice White, the author of the majority opinions in Wolff and Meachum, insisted
that "neither Wolff . . . nor Meachum . . . suggested that state law is the only
source of a prisoner's liberty worthy of federal constitutional protection." Id. a t
467-68 (White, J., concurring).
140.
See, for example, Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983), where the Court
continued the highly restrictive Meachum theory.
The Court wrote that Helms "argues, rather weakly, that the Due Process
Clause implicitly creates an interest in being confined to a general population cell,
rather than the more austere and restrictive administrative segregation quarters."
The Court concluded that "his argument seeks to draw from the Due Process
Clause more than it can provide." Id. at 466-67.
Hewitt involved the extended use of administrative segregation without observance of the panoply of Wolfs procedural requirements. Helms, a state prisoner
was thought to have participated in a riot and was confined to an administrative
segregation unit, pending investigation into his role. The Court determined that
"administrative segregation is the sort of confinement that inmates should reasonably anticipate receiving a t some point in their incarceration." Id. a t 468. The
Court characterized Helms's transfer as being merely "from one extremely restricted environment to an even more confined situation," id. at 473, concluding that in
order to confine to administrative segregation a prisoner feared to be a threat to
institutional security, the only process due was "an informal nonadversary review
of evidence." Id. at 474.
The procedural safeguards of Wolff need not apply. Thus the Court permitted
labels: disciplinary (Wolff)compared to classification (Meachum) and an administrative transfer (Hewitt) rather than substance and motivation to determine procedural
rights.
141.
445 U.S. 480 (1980).
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procedural safeguards even greater than those required by
Wolfs prison discipline analysis? A decade later, relying on
Vitek, in Washington v. Harper,143the Court again firmly acknowledged that a prisoner possesses a "significant liberty
interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs."144But the Court's treatment of retained rights
has proved ephemeral. Vitek and Harper are the rare except i o n ~ , a' ~s ~the states' stronger claims have almost invariably
outweighed the claimed liberty interest.146

C. Specific Bill of Rights Provisions
1. Pretrial detainees-Bell

v. Wolfish

In the restrictive atmosphere of prison, constitutional guarantees that may be taken for granted in free society assume far
greater importance. The opportunities to pursue religious beliefs, to read a book, to write and receive a letter from a friend,
or to have a family visit provide a vital link between the inmate and the outside world. These simple acts nourish the
prisoner's mind, provide a respite from "the blankness and
bleakness of his environment," and help to cultivate rehabilitation, 14'
Even before Wolfl, the Court had recognized fundamental
142. Id. at 494.
143.
494 U S . 210 (1990).
144. Id. a t 221-22. However, the Court held that, "given the requirements of the
prison environment, the Due Process Clause permits the State to treat a prison
inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will,
if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the
inmates' medical interest." Id. a t 227. Furthermore, the Special Offender Center's
policy was "neither arbitrary nor erroneous" and satisfied the procedural protections
required by the Due Process Clause. Id. at 228. This was so, even though the
decision to medicate an inmate against his will was made at a hearing by medical
professionals rather than a judge. Id. at 228-35.
145. But see Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), where the Court recognized
that the decision to marry is a constitutionally protected fundamental right even in
the prison context. Id. at 96. Inmate marriages "are expressions of emotional support and public commitment," have spiritual significance, are an exercise of religious faith, and have an effect on the receipt of governmental benefits, property
rights, and other less tangible benefits that are unaffected by the fact of confinement or legitimate corrections goals. Id. a t 95-96. For a full discussion of % r e r ,
see infra text accompanying notes 215-46.
146.
Justice Rehnquist cogently summarized this view, noting that "our decisions
have consistently refused to recognize more than the most basic liberty interests in
prisoners." Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983).
147.
See Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 129 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd sub nom. Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).

882

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992

rights protected by specific Bill of Rights provisions. The Court
required limited desegregation of prison inmates,148guaranteed the right to a reasonable opportunity t o pursue religious
faith,14' and limited the censorship of mail.150Most importantly, the states were required to provide meaningful access to
the court^.'^'
Wolf inaugurated the period in which the Court was t o
take a more meaningful role in prison administration. Wolf
itself dealt not merely with procedural due process in disciplinary hearings, but also with the claims that prison regulations
infringed upon the prisoner's First and Sixth Amendment
rights.lS:!The Court decided that the possibility that contraband may be exchanged in letters, even from attorneys, warranted having prison officials inspect letters in an inmate's
presence. '"
As the Court took note of valid constitutional claims of
prison inmates, it was also aware of the danger of meddling too
extensively in the day-to-day administration of prisons. The
problems of operating a correctional facility are enormous, and
the Court believed it must give prison administrators
wide-ranging deference in adapting and executing those policies
needed to preserve internal order.15" Therefore, even when an
institutional restriction infringed a specific constitutional guar-

Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (ordering prison desegregation,
148.
while acknowledging that security needs might limit the extent of the decree).
Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972).
149.
150. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S.396 (1974).
Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105 (N.D.Cal. 1970), affd sub nom. Youn151.
ger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971) (constitutionally mandated law libraries or alternative sources of legal knowledge); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S.483 (1969) (inmates
may assist other inmates in preparation of petitions if no other reasonable alternative provided); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S.546 (1941) (State may not abridge or impair a prisoner's right to apply to federal court for a writ of habeas corpus). The
Gilmore theory was reaffirmed in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977), making i t clear that the Constitution requires that prisoners have access to either
"adequate law libraries" or to "adequate assistance from persons trained in the
law" to aid them in pursuing claimed violations of fundamental constitutional
rights in the courts.
152. W O E v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 574-77 (1974).
Id. a t 577. A lawyer desiring to correspond with a prisoner may also be
153.
required first to "identify himself and his client to the prison officials to assure
that the letters marked privileged are actually from members of the bar." Id. a t
576-77. The state conceded that it "cannot open and mud mail from attorneys to
inmates." Id. at 575.
Id. at 566.
154.
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antee, the practice must be appraised in connection with the
main purpose of prison administration-preserving institutional safety.lss In Bell v. Wolfish,lS6 the Court concluded that
pretrial detainees pose security risks similar to those of convicted inmates,15' and, while prior decisions focused on convicted inmates, the "principle of deference" was not dependent
on this fact.ls8
The specific conditions and restrictions challenged in Wolfish were "double bunking,"ls9 t h e enforcement of a
"publisher-only" rule (prohibiting receipt of hard-cover books
that were not mailed directly from the p ~ b l i s h e r ) , 'the
~ ~ prohibition against receipt of packages from outside the facility
containing food o r personal property,16' the "unannounced
searches of inmate living areas at irregular intervals" ("shaked o w n ~ " ) , 'and
~ ~ finally, visual body cavity searches after contact visits with persons from outside the institution.
The Wolfish Court analyzed the special status of pretrial
detainees, identifying a special Fourteenth Amendment right
"not [to] be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law."la The Court noted that "not
every disability imposed during pretrial detention amounts to
punishment in the constitutional sense."lB5 To ascertain
whether it was punishment, the subjective intent of prison officials was decisive.lGG
"Absent a showing of a n expressed in-

155.
See Jones v. North Carolina hisonerd Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129
(1977).
156.
441 U.S. 520 (1979).
Id. at 546 n.28.
157.
Id. at 547 n.29.
158.
159.
Id. at 530.
160. Id. at 548-49.
161. Id. at 553 (exception of one package of food a t Christmas).
Id. at 555.
162.
163. Id. at 558.
164. Id. a t 535.
165. Id. at 537.
166. Id. a t 537-38. The Court applied a punishment test established in Kennedy
v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether i t
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of punishmenWretribution and deterrence),
whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be c o ~ e c t e dis assignable
for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry, and may often point in
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tent to punish on the part of the detention facility," the determination of whether the particular restriction amounts t o punishment turns on whether it is "reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective" and not excessive in relation t o
that purpose.167The Court declared that the government may
lawfully incarcerate a suspected criminal before trial, and any
restraints that reasonably relate t o jail security "do not, without more, constitute unconstitutional punishment, even if they
are discomf~rting."'~~
Applying this analysis, the Wolfish Court determined that
the double-bunking practice did not violate the inmate's due
process rights.16"'There was no 'one man, one cell' principle
lurking in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment"'" that would prohibit the placing of two detainees in
an "admittedly rather small sleeping place" for a maximum
period of sixty days.l7'
To define the rights of pretrial detainees, Wolfish relied on
principles the Court had established over the past decade to
determine the constitutional restrictions of convicted persons.
Although detainees are entitled at least to those retained constitutional rights of convicted persons, all restrictions, even
those that impinge upon a specific constitutional guarantee,
"must be evaluated in the light of the central objective of prison
administration, safeguarding institutional ~ecurity."'~~
A detainee simply does not possess the full range of freedoms accorded to an unincarcerated individual. In balancing
the competing interests, "[plrison administrators therefore
should be accorded wide-ranging deference" not only for their
expertise in running a corrections institution, but also because

differing directions.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
167. Wolfish, 441 US. at 538-39."Conversely, if a restriction or condition is not
reasonably related to a legitimate goal-if it is arbitrary or purposeless-a court
permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment
that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua detainees." Id. a t 539.
168. Id. at 540.
169. Id. at 541.
170. Id. a t 542. The federal government operated the detention facility in Wolfish: thus, the applicability of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.
171. Id. at 543. The "detainees [were] required to spend only seven or eight
hours each day in their rooms, during most or all of which they presumably
[slept] . . . . During the remainder of the time, [they were] free to move between
their rooms and the common area." Id. (footnote omitted).
172. Id. at 547.
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the operation of detention facilities "is peculiarly the province
of the Legislative and Executive Branches of our Government,
not the ~udicial."'~~
With this principle firmly established, the Court, on security grounds, upheld the regulations against all of the constitutional challenges. The "publisher-only" rule for hard-cover
books did not violate the First Amendment since it reduced the
chances that contraband would enter the prison. This "limited
restriction [was] a rational response . . . to an obvious security
problem."'74 Limitations on packages were held not to violate
due process because of the administrative inconvenience of
storing food and the serious security problems that arise fiom
the introduction of such packages into the in~tituti0n.l~~
The
"shakedowny'searches in the absence of prisoners cld not violate the Fourth Amendment and were permitted as facilitating
"the safe and effective performance of the ~ e a r c h . " ' ~ ~ i n a l l ~ ,
the practice that instinctively gave the Court the most pause,
the visual body cavity searches after contact visits,'77 was upheld as reasonable to deter the smuggling of weapons, drugs,
and other contraband into the in~titution.'~~
2. Eighth Amendment-Cruel
Rhodes v. Chapman

and Unusual Punishment-

The Wolfish Court agreed that the Due Process Clause was
the primary source of protection for pretrial detainees. "Due

173. Wolfish, 441 U.S. a t 547, 548.
174. Id. at 550.
175. Id. at 553-55.
176. Id. a t 557. The Court assumed, argzmzh, "that a pretrial detainee retain[ed] . . . a diminished expectation of privacy after commitment to a custodial
facility." Id. Subsequently, in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984), the
Supreme Court held that "a prisoner 'has no expectation of privacy in his prison
cell entitling him to the protection of the Fourth Amendment."
177. See infra notes 315-34 and accompanying text.
178.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 558-59. Even though the district court noted that it
would be virtually impossible for a prisoner wearing a jumpsuit zipped to the neck
and under constant observation to hide items in a body cavity, United States ex
rel. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd in part, rev'd and
remanded in part sub nom. Wolfish v. Levi, 537 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd sub
nom. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), the possibility that a prisoner might do
so justified the practice. The Supreme Court observed that there had been only one
instance where the inmate "was discovered attempting to smuggle contraband into
the institution on his person," and credited this not to a lack of interest on the
inmate's part to secrete such items but to the effectiveness of this practice a s a
search technique. 441 U.S. at 559.
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process requires that a pretrial detainee not be p~nished."'~~
Once convicted, however, the State acquires the power to punish "although the punishment may not be 'cruel and unusual'
under the Eighth Amendment."'80
The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clau~e,'~'like all
the other great clauses of the Constitution, is not subject to
easy resolution. But, framed in this clause are the values basic
to a "civilized society." It is, therefore, not surprising that the
lower federal courts, in the 1970s, first turned to this passage
in the Constitution when faced with the degrading conditions of
confinement in the Arkansas prison system.'" By 1981, federal courts in at least twenty-four states had declared the conditions in certain prisons and, in some cases the entire prison
system, unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.lS3
Rhodes u. Chapman'" was the Supreme Court's first
full-fledged consideration of Eighth Amendment claims by
prison inmates. ls5 The Southern Ohio Correctional Facility
(SOCF), a maximum-security prison, was a modern institution
and "unquestionably a top-flight, first-class facility."''' "The
food was 'adequate in every respect,'" "the noise in the cell-

179.
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979).
180. Id.
181.
The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII.
182.
The first prison litigation decision that enforced this provision was Holt v.
Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), affd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). In
Holt, the district court found the Arkansas prison violated the Eighth Amendment
rights of the prisoners confined there. See supra text accompanying notes 79-85 for
a discussion of the Holt decisions.
183.
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 353 n.1 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring
in the judgment). "There [were] over 8,000 pending cases filed by inmates challenging prison conditions." Id. at 354 n.2.
184.
452 U.S. 337 (1981).
185.
In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), the Supreme Court had held that
the government must provide medical care to those whom it punishes by imprisonment. "[Dleliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment."
Id. a t 104 (citation omitted); see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986) (infliction of pain in the course of security measures to resolve disturbance is an Eighth
Amendment violation only if inflicted unnecessarily and wantonly); cf. Hutto v.
F i ~ e y 437
,
U.S. 678 (1978) (ultimately affirming the findings and remedies of the
Arkansas prison decisions, limiting the maximum period of punitive isolation to 30
days).
186.
Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. 1007, 1009 (S.D. Ohio 1977), afd, 624
F.2d 1099 (6th Cir. 1980), reu'd, 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
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blocks was not excessive," and the cells were free from odor
with the temperature well controlled.18' "In addition to 1,620
cells, it ha[d] gymnasiums, workshops, schoolrooms, 'dayrooms ,'
two chapels, a hospital ward, commissary, barbershop," outdoor
recreation field, visitation area and garden, and a modern
well-lit and superior library.'" Its only failing was the practice of "double celling" prisoners because of overcr~wding,'~~
a
practice the district court concluded was cruel and unusual
punishment.lgO
Applying general principles that the Eighth Amendment
" 'must draw its meaning from . . . evolving standards of decency,' "lgl the Court noted that prison conditions must neither inflict unnecessary and wanton pain "nor be grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting imprisonment."'g"ut
conditions that are not cruel and unusual
under contemporary standards of decency are not unconstitutional. "To the extent that such conditions [may be] restrictive
and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal
offenders pay for their offenses against society."lg3 Double
celling at SOCF "did not lead to deprivations of essential food,
medical care, or sanitation. Nor did it increase violence among
inmates . . . ."Ig4Whatever cbscomfort it might have caused,
it fell far short of violating the Constituti~n.'~~
The Court acknowledged that the judiciary had a "responsibility to scrutinize claims of cruel and unusual confinement."'" But, in discharging their responsibility, the "courts
187. Rhodes, 452 U.S.at 342 (quoting Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. a t 1019).
Id. at 340-41.
188.
189. Id. a t 343-44. Of prime concern to the district court was that the double
celling was not a temporary condition, and that it was forced upon inmates serving
long prison terms, who spent most of their time in the cell. Id.
190. Id. at 343. The district court determined that each inmate should have a t
least 50-55 square feet of space, but the double-celled inmates shared only 63
square feet. The district court asserted double celling was a permanent practice a t
SOCF and that prisoners who were double celled spent most of their time in the
cell with their cellmates. The district court concluded that double celling at SOCF
was cruel and unusual punishment. Id. a t 343-44. Only Justice Marshall agreed
that confinement to this limited cell space qualified as "cruel and unusual punishment." Id. a t 375 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
191.
452 U.S. a t 346 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality
opinion)).
Id. at 346-47.
192.
193. Id. at 347.
194. Id. at 348.
Id. at 347-48.
195.
196. Id. at 352.
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cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials are
The
insensitive to the requirements of the Constit~tion."'~~
Rhodes Court could not mask its disappointment in the lower
courts, admonishing them to "bear in mind that their inquiries
'spring from constitutional requirements and that judicial answers to them must reflect that fact rather than [their] idea of
how best to operate a detention facility.""g8 The Court
strongly cautioned lower federal court judges not t o use the
Eighth Amendment as a vehicle for prison reform. To insure
compliance, the Court demanded deference to state legislatures
and prison officials.199
In Wilson v. Seiter?O0 the Court added to its Eighth
Amendment analysis an additional element: an intent requirement. The Wilson Court noted that Rhodes focused on the objective component of an Eighth Amendment prison claim (that
double celling was not sufficiently inhumane) and did not need
t o consider the "subjective component (did the officials act with
a sufficiently culpable state of mind?)."201Since the infliction
of punishment is a deliberate act intended to chastise or deter,
Justice Scalia, for the Wilson majority, held that prisoners
challenging the conditions of their confinement202under the
197. Id. Writing separately, Justice Blackmun perceived that some of Rhodes's
language may be
a signal to prison administrators that the federal courts now are to adopt
a policy of general deference to such administrators and to state legislatures, deference not only for the purpose of determining contemporary
standards of decency, but for the purpose of determining whether conditions a t a particular prison are cruel and unusual within the meaning of
the Eighth Amendment.
Id. a t 369 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted). Noting
that such deference was the old attitude held several decades ago, he agreed with
Justice Brennan "that the federal courts must continue t o be available to those
state inmates who sincerely claim that the conditions to which they are subjected
are violative of the Amendment." Id.
198.
452 U.S. at 351 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979)).
Id. at 352.
199.
200.
111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991).
Id. a t 2324.
201.
202.
I n Wilson, an Ohio prison inmate challenged a number of conditions of his
confinement, including "overcrowding, excessive noise, insufficient locker storage
space, inadequate heating and cooling, improper ventilation, . . . unsanitary dining
facilities and food preparation," and the housing of well inmates with mentally and
physically ill inmates. Id. at 2323.
The Rhodes Court had observed that conditions of confinement, "alone or in
combination, may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Justice B r e ~ a nhad viewed
the Court as having adopted a "totality of the circumstances test." Id. at 363 n.10
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Eighth Amendment must show "deliberate indifference" by the
responsible officiaLm3 For Justice Scalia, this mandated an
inquiry into the prison officials' state of mind.
Wilson's intent requirement was not only a departure from
Rhodes, but it may also prove difficult to apply.204The judicial opinions detailing prison conditions do not make for pleasant reading.205 For example, the Alabama system was described by a U.S. health official as "wholly unfit for human
habitation according to virtually every criterion used for evaluation by public health inspectors.'n06 The institutions were
"horrendously overcrowded" and infested with roaches, flies,
and other vermin. The food was "unappetizing and unwholesome," poorly prepared, and "infested with insects." There was
"rampant violence," where the weaker inmates were repeatedly
victimized by the stronger inmates, and where "robbery, rape,
extortion, theft and assault [were] everyday occurrences"
among the general population.207 The Alabama experience
was not an aberration, as similar tales of horror were recounted concerning other institution^.'^^
( B r e ~ a n J.,
, concurring in the judgment).
Justice Scalia explained that, in his view, Rhodes did not mean to establish
such a broad proposition. For him, "[nlothing so amorphous as 'overall conditions'
can rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment when no specific deprivation
of a single human need exists." Wilson, 111 S. Ct. a t 2327. He viewed Rhodes's
combination language to require the conditions to have a "mutually enforcing effect
that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food,
warmth, or exercise-for example, a low cell temperature a t night combined with a
failure to issue blankets." Id.
203.
Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2326-27.
204.
Id. at 2328-31 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
205.
See, eg., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 354-56 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (describing the gruesome conditions in the Alabama
penal system); supra text accompanying notes 79-85 (describing the Arkansas correctional system).
206.
Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 323-24 W.D. Ala. 1976), afPd a s modzfied
sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part on other
grounds sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (per curiam), and cert. denied
sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 438 U.S. 915 (1978).
207.
Pugh, 406 F. Supp. a t 322-25.
208.
See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 353 n.1 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1391 (S.D.
Tex. 1980).
[Ilt is impossible for a written opinion to convey the pernicious conditions
and the pain and degradation which ordinary inmates suffer within [unconstitutionally operated prisons]-the gruesome experiences of youthful
first offenders forcibly raped; the cruel and justifiable fears of inmates,
wondering when they will be called upon to defend the next violent assault; the sheer misery, the discomfort, the wholesale loss of privacy for

890

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992

To permit prison officials to "interpose [as their] defense
that they made good faith efforts to obtain funding," but that
"fiscal constraints beyond their control prevented the elimination of inhumane conditions,"209would be to ignore serious
deprivations of basic human needs.210 These conditions are
the consequence of the cumulative actions by state legislative
bodies and prison administrations over a long period of
time.211 A reasonably safe and sanitary environment, free
from conditions which inexorably and unnecessarily cause
physical and mental deterioration, should be the Court's goal.
Confinement with dignity should be society's hallmark.

IV. THE NEWLYMINTEDSTANDARD
A. Turner v. Safley-A

Crushing Blow To Prisoners' Rights

By the mid-1980s' the Supreme Court was firmly enmeshed in prison litigation. WolfP12 and wolfish213 played a
critical role in shaping the Court's theories. Wolff catered to
deference but still counseled a reasonable accommodation.
Wolfish turned to the historical role of the judiciary in penal
reform and mandated a position of even greater deference to
the judgment of prison administrator^.^'^

prisoners housed with one, two, or three others in a forty-five foot cell or
suffocatingly packed together in a crowded dormitory; the physical suffering and wretched psychological stress which must be endured by those
sick or injured who cannot obtain adequate medical care . . . .
For those who are incarcerated within [such prisons], these conditions
and experiences form the content and essence of daily existence.
Rhodm, 452 U.S. a t 353 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
209.
Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2326 (1991). Justice Scalia would apparently accept this defense. He noted that even if this were so, "it is hard to understand how it could control the meaning of 'cruel and unusual punishment' in the
Eighth Amendment. An intent requirement is either implicit in the word
'punishment' or it is not; it cannot be alternately required and ignored as policy
considerations might dictate." Id.
210.
A rare alliance was forged in Wilson when the Justice Department joined
the American Civil Liberties Union in urging rejection of intent. As argued by the
United States: "[S]eriously inhumane, pervasive conditions should not be insulated
from constitutional challenge because the officials managing the institution have
exhibited a conscientious concern for ameliorating its problems, and have made
efforts (albeit unsuccess~l)to that end." Id. at 2331 (White, J., concurring in the
judgment) (citing brief for the United States as amicus curie at 19).
Id. at 2330.
211.
212.
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
Bell v. WoKish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
213.
214.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. a t 540-41 11.23 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817,
827 (1974)). The Court repeated this admonition a second time. Id. a t 547 11.29.
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As the Court began to translate the proper posture of deference into meaningful practices, there was still much disagreement as to the appropriate standard to apply when prison
regulations impinged on fundamental constitutional rights. In
Turner u. Safley?l5 the Court provided the solid guidance
needed for determining whether regulations promulgated by
prison administrators run afoul of constitutional rights retained by prisoners.
The inmates in Turner challenged two prison regulations.
The first regulation permitted correspondence between "immediate family members who [were] inmates in other correctional
institutions," and between inmates "concerning legal matters,"
but did not allow other inmate-to-inmate correspondence unless
the "treatment team" of each inmate approved.216In practice,
the effect of this regulation completely prohibited correspondence between unrelated inmates.217The second regulation
permitted prisoners to marry other inmates or civilians only
with the permission of the prison ~uperintendent.~"
Permission was to be given only where there were "compelling reasons" for the marriage-interpreted by prison officials as "pregnancy or the birth of an illegitimate
The Court acknowledged that its task was "to formulate a
standard of review for prisoners7 constitutional claims that
[was] responsive both to the 'policy of judicial restraint regarding prisoner complaints and [to] the need to protect constitutional rights.' 7'2Z0 The court of appeals had affirmed the district court's application of a "strict scrutiny standard,"221reasoning that this standard was appropriate since both regulations prohibited the exercise of fundamental right^.'^ But
Justice O'Connor (writing for the majority) disagreed, and,
after reviewing some of the Court's more recent prisoners'
rights decisions, found in those decisions the makings of a
general standard. In none of these cases had the Court applied
215. 482 U.S.78 (1987).
216. Id. at 81-82.
217. Id. at 82. "[Tlhe determination whether to permit inmates to correspond
was based on team members' familiarity with the progress reports, conduct violations, and psychological reports in the inmates' files rather than on individual
review of each piece of mail." Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 85 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 406 (1974)).
221. Id. at 83.
222. Id. at 87.

892

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992

a standard of "heightened scrutiny." Rather, the Court had
inquired "whether a prison regulation that burdens fundamental rights is 'reasonably related' to legitimate penological objectives, or whether it represents an 'exaggerated response' to
those concerns."223
Applying an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis to the
day-to-day judgments of prison officials, O'Connor reasoned,
"would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security
problems and to adopt innovative solutions" to difficult administrative problems. Furthermore, a strict scrutiny rule would
"distort the decisionmaking process," inevitably making the
courts the final arbiter of "what constitutes the best soluthereby " 'unnecessarily perpetuat[ing] the involvement of the federal courts in affairs of prison administration.' "225
Justice O'Connor outlined four factors relevant to her "reasonableness" analysis. First is a " 'valid, rational connection'
between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental
interest put forward t o justify it."226The goal must be a legitimately neutral one and the logical connection between it and
the regulation not so remote as to render it "arbitrary or irrati~nal."~~~
The second consideration is the availability of other means
by which the prisoner could exercise the right2" Where "other avenues" remain available, she cautioned that "the courts
should be particularly conscious of the 'measure of judicial
deference' " to be accorded to the professional judgment of prison officials.229
The third consideration is the impact that granting a certain right will have on the guards and other inmates.230Recognizing that "few changes will have no ramifications on the
liberty of others or on the use of the prison's limited resources
for preserving institutional order,"231deference to the "informed discretion of corrections officials" is necessary, especial-

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

482 U.S. at 87.
at 89.
(quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 US. 396, 407 (1974)).
(quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)).
at 89-90.
at 90.
(quoting Pel1 v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ly when accommodating the asserted right "will have a significant 'ripple effect' on fellow inmates or on prison staff"232
Finally, if the prisoner has "an alternative that fully accommodates [his] rights, at de minimis cost to valid penological
interests," such an alternative is evidence a court may consider
in determining whether "the regulation does not satisfy the
reasonable relationship standard."233 Justice O'Connor
warned that this last factor "is not a 'least restrictive alternative' test" but, "[bly the same token, the existence of obvious,
easy alternatives [is] evidence that the regulation" may be unreasonable and "an 'exaggerated response' to prison concern~."~~~
Addressing the new standard, Justice O'Comor credited
the prison officials' testimony that "mail between institutions
can be used to communicate escape plans and to arrange assaults and other violent acts" and to facilitate prison gang
activities.235Applying her analysis to the record "clearly demonstrat[ed] that the regulation was reasonably related to legitimate security interest^."^^ Moreover, the regulation did not
"deprive prisoners of all means of expression," but merely
barred communication with a limited class of persons (inmates
of other state institutions) "with whom prison officials have
particular cause to be ~oncerned."~~'
The potential "ripple effect" on other inmates and prison
personnel is great. Accepting the prison officials' professional
judgment that "correspondence between [prisons] facilitates the
development of informal organizations that threaten . . . safety
and internal security,"2s8 Justice O'Connor believed that the
asserted correspondence right could "be exercised only a t the
cost of signXcantly less liberty and safety for everyone
Justice O'Connor determined that there were no "obvious,
easy alternatives'' to the existing regulations, rejecting as inadequate and overly burdensome the prisoners' sole proposal of

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

482 U.S. at 90.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 91.
Id.
Id. at 92.
Id.
Id.
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monitoring the c o r r e s p ~ n d e n c e .She
~ ~ ~agreed with the prison
officials that it would be impossible for the mailroom "to read
every piece of inmate-to-inmate correspondence," and consequently, there was an "appreciable risk of missing dangerous
messages." "In any event, prisoners could easily write in jargon
or codes to prevent detection of their real messages."241
Justice O'Comor concluded that the "prohibition on correspondence [was] reasonably related to valid corrections goals"
(institutional security), was not a n exaggerated response to this
concern, and therefore did not unconstitutionally abridge the
prisoner's First Amendment rights.242
The rule allowing inmate marriages only with permission
of the prison superintendent did not, however, pass the reasonable relationship standard. Recognizing the decision to marry
as a fundamental right, Justice O'Connor characterized the
regulation as a n "exaggerated response" to the security and
rehabilitative objectives of the State.243She noted that there
were "obvious, easy alternatives" readily available to prison
officials to accommodate the right to marry that imposed a
minimal burden on security?
The "newly minted"u5 standard announced in Turner, of
course, was hardly new, since O'Comor drew upon previous
decisions in identifying the several factors relevant to a rea~ ~ ~ O'Connor had merely
sonableness d e t e r m i n a t i ~ n .Justice
482 U.S. at 93.
Id.
Id.
Id. a t 97-98. The security justification advanced by prison officials concerned
the possibilities of violent "love triangles" leading to confrontation between inmates.
Id. a t 97. Justice O ' C o ~ o rsummarily rejected this, reasoning that such inmate
rivalries were just as likely to occur without a formal marriage ceremony. Id. a t
98.
Secondly, the prison administration asserted a rehabilitative theory, encouraging
self-reliance among female inmates abused a t home or who exhibited a detrimental
overdependence on males. Id. a t 97. Superintendent Turner testified that "in his
view, these women [inmates] needed to concentrate on developing skills of
self-reliance," and "that the prohibition on marriage furthered this rehabilitative
goal." Id. Justice O'Connor found the asserted rehabilitative objective "suspect," as
only one marriage request was refused on the basis of fostering excessive dependency; and excessively paternalistic, as all female requests were scrutinized carefully while males were routinely approved. Id. at 99. Furthermore, the "rehabilitation
concern [in the record] centered almost exclusively on female inmates marrying
other inmates or ex-felons," and this "does not account for the ban on
inmate-civilian marriages." Id.
244.
Id. at 98.
245.
Id. at 101 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
246.
The elements of reasonableness in llmzer are similar to those factors that

240.
241.
242.
243.
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supplemented her "reasonable relationship" analysis by expanding upon additional factors that should be considered in
evaluating the challenged prison regulation. The decision's
basic framework contained many of the same considerations
that had constituted the unique components of the Court's prior
analysis.
More importantly, the Court once again emphasized "deference" over "rights." The Court's challenge was how t o best protect those precious few prisoners' rights that remained while
accommodating institutional needs. Turner refused to break the
pattern: "categorical deference" was once again the order of the
day.

B. Turner's Progeny-The Knockout Punch
Turner framed the standard of review, delineating the
boundaries within which the debate over prisoners' rights must
take place. The Court's values and motives were clearly enunciated, its language a clear signal to prison administrators that
categorical deference to their judgment was to continue as a
policy of the Rehnquist Court.247Rapidly, the Court dismantled other potential "prisoners' rights."
One week after deciding Turner, the Court applied its standard to policies adopted by state correctional officials that effectively prevented Muslim inmates, who were assigned to outside
work crews, from attending Jumu'ah, the central weekly religious service of their faith. In O'Lone v. Estate of Shabaz~?~'
Muslim inmates challenged prison policies aimed at relieving
service overcrowding, but which had the incidental effect of
preventing them fiom attending Jumu'ah. Si&icant security
problems arose with Muslims assigned to outside work details.
As their return posed unacceptable security risks and administrative burdens, a new policy memorandum "prohibited in-

the Court had developed in prior decisions. Justice O'Connor specifically cited prior
prisoners' rights cases as the origins of the factors she developed in her analyses.
Turner, 482 US. at 89-90 (citing Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984);Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979);Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc.,
433 U.S. 119 (1977); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974)). Justice O'Connor
stated that Pell, Jones, and Bell had probably already determined the proper standard for review. Id. at 89. But if not, she resolved it: "[Wlhen a prison regulation
impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests." Id.
247. See l h m r , 482 US. at 85.
248. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
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mates . . . from returning to the prison during the day except
in the case of emergency."249
The Supreme Court, in a n opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, determined that the court of appeals was clearly
wrong when it required the state to show that it had made a
bona fide inquiry into whether reasonable methods existed by
which the prisoners' religious rights could be accommodated
without creating security problems.250 The court of appeals
believed that
[wlhere it is found that reasonable methods of accommodation
can be adopted without sacrificing either the state's interest
in security or the prisoners' interest in freely exercising their
religious rights, the state's refusal to allow the observance of
a central religious practice cannot be justified and violates the
prisoners' First Amendment rightsSZ5l

But the Chief Justice firmly declared that this articulated approach had failed "to reflect the respect and deference that the
United States constitution allows for the judgment of prison
ad~ninistrators."~~~
Although mutual accommodation is relevant to the reasonableness inquiry, Chief Justice Rehnquist
reasoned that prison administrators do not "'have to set up
and then shoot down every conceivable method of accommodating the [prisoners'] constitutional' " rights?
Applying the new Turner standards, Chief Justice
Rehnquist found beyond doubt that the new policy was related
to legitimate security concerns.254 Furthermore, the Muslim
inmates' ability "to participate in other religious observances of
their faith" gave added credence to the determination that the
restrictions were reasonable.255Finally, the inmates' suggested accommodations256would "threaten prison security by allowing 'affinity groups' in the prison to flourish" and create a
perception of favoritism toward the ~ u s l i m s . ~The
~ ' Chief
249.
Id. at 347.
Id. at 350.
250.
251.
Shabazz v. O'Lone, 782 F.2d 416, 420 (3d Cir.), stay denied sub m m .
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 478 U.S. 1033 (1986), and reu'd, 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
252.
O'Lom, 482 U.S. at 350.
253.
Id. (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90-91 (1987)).
254.
Id. at 351.
Id. at 352.
255.
256.
The inmates suggested "placing all Muslim inmates in one or two inside
work details or providing weekend labor for Muslim inmates." Id.
257.
Id. at 353.
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Justice concluded by redfirming the Court's refusal, "even
where claims are made under the First Amendment" Free Exercise Clause, "to 'substitute [its] judgment on . . . difficult and
sensitive matters of institutional administration' " for the prison administrators' determination.258
Deference had assumed a new constitutional prominence in
prison decisions. Incoming publications would now be constitutionally rejected if prison officials found their contents were
" 'detrimental to . . . security, good order, or discipline"' or
" 'might facilitate criminal activity.' "259 This time, despite the
apparent vagueness of the terms used in the regulations, Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority in Thornburgh u.
A b b ~ t t , ~declared
~'
the terms facially valid in order to give
prison authorities broad discretion.261The warden had once
again achieved free reign to censor what the prisoners
read.262
In Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson,263
Justice Blackmun, once again writing for the majority, gave
correctional officials unbridled authority over the "basic human
need" of the prisoner to see family and friends2* In Thompson, Justice Blackmun questioned whether it could "seriously
be contended . . . that an inmate's interest in unfettered visitation is guaranteed directly by the Due Process Clause."265
Finding that the "denial of prison access to a particular visitor"
was " 'within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated
by a prison sentence,' " the Court determined that access was
258.
Id. (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 588 (1984)).
259.
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 404 (1989) (quoting 28 C.F.R.
g 540.71(b) (1988)).
260.
490 U.S. 401 (1989).
261.
Id. at 419. The regulations authorize rejection of the entire publication,
even if just one page presents a n intolerable security risk. Id. a t 431 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The primary justification advanced for
the rule was administrative convenience. A contrary rule would require "1aborious1y
going over each article in each publication" and defacing the material. Id. a t 43233.
Justice Stevens criticized the "meat-ax" abridgment of the First Amendment
rights on the general speculation that some administrative burden might ensue. Id.
Moreover, he found it difficult to imagine such a burden "if, as the regulations'
text seems to require, prison officials actually read an article before rejecting it,
the incremental burden associated with clipping out the offending matter could not
be of constitutional significance." Id.
262.
490 U.S. at 428 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
263.
490 U S . 454 (1989).
264.
Id. at 465-66 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
265.
Thompson, 490 U.S. at 460.
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not independently protected by the Due Process Clause?
Furthermore, the state regulations lacked the requisite "mandatory language" to establish a "liberty interest" entitled to the
protections of the Due Process Clause.267After Thompson, the
warden was free to deny prisoners visits from family members
or friends without stating a reason; hence, there were practically no constraint^.^"
Turner, Ozone, Abbott, and Thompson clearly demonstrated how feeble any protection would be under Wolfs call for a
"reasonable accommodation." In less than two years, the Court
had, under the warden's waving of the security flag, severely
limited the inmates' First Amendment rights and placed within
the warden's unchecked discretion the most "basic human
need" of an inmate to see his family. The warden, with the
Court's blessing, was now firmly the master a t the helm. Deference had become the substitute shibboleth for "hands-off." The
chance of reaching any meaningful "mutual accommodation"
appeared slim.

MODEL
V. A CRITICISMOF THE DEFERENCE
Prisoners are politically powerless to change their conditions. They are voteless and socially threatening. As crime
rates have increased, public apathy has contributed to the negative attitude of politicians and prison officials toward any
substantial reform. I t is generally accepted that prisoners, isolated fiom public view and regarded with disgust by the politic,
are receiving their "just deserts." Against this background, the
lower federal courts emerged as the critical force able to ameliorate inhumane conditions during the 1970s and 1 9 8 0 s . ~ ~ ~
But deference has assumed the prominent position in prison litigation. The likelihood of achieving any meaningful "mutual accommodation" is minimal as long as the Supreme Court
continues to categorically yield to the .prison authority's own
assessment of its security needs. By readjusting the scales in
266.
Id. at 461 (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983)).
Id. at 464-65.
267.
268.
But compare Justice Kennedy's concurrence: "Nothing in the Court's opinion
forecloses the claim that a prison regulation permanently forbidding all visits to
some or all prisoners implicates the protections of the Due Process Clause in a
way that the precise and individualized restrictions at issue here do not." Id. at
, concurring).
465 ( K e ~ e d y J.,
269.
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 359 (1981) ( B r e ~ a n ,J., concurring in
the judgment).
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the deference direction, respect for any residual rights that
may have been retained by prisoners has been restricted or
simply eliminated. The Court's continual capricious invocation
of the deference model runs the risk of returning prisons to the
past when prevailing conditions of "barbarism and squalor . . .
were met with a judicial blind eye and a 'hands off approa~h."~~~

A. Judicial Restraint-Administrative Expertise
Prison litigation marks an important accommodation between courts and other branches of government, in particular
between the federal courts and state institutions. It is exemplary not merely because of its complexity, but because of the degree of judicial intrusion. To some commentators, the prison
cases evidence "judicial a~tivism.'~~'
This label may suggest
that courts are acting in a field more properly within the executive and legislative spheres of influence. Intimately connected
to this theme is the idea that the courts must be wary of violating traditional separation of powers principles. A fundamental
precept of this commentary is that when the court orders an
institutional remedy, even if it does not cross a well-defined legal line, it steps too close to the boundaries of other.branches of
government.
A closely connected motif concerns the courts performing
administrative and supervisory tasks with which they have
little familiarity and too few qualifications. Without statutory
authority, these burdens are seen as the sole responsibility of
prison authorities.
And, of course, there should be sensitivity t o federalism
concerns whenever a federal court makes intrusive orders regulating state institutions. Overriding the entire debate is the
question of judicial authority to allocate public funds to effect
its orders.272The necessary funds, if available at all, are gen-

270.
Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 594 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring in
the judgment).
271.
For a general discussion on judicial activism, see Abram Chayes, The Role
of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV.'L. REV. 1281 (1976); Archibald
Cox, The New Dimensions of ConstitutiC%il Adjudication, 51 WASH. L. REV. 791
(1976); Robert D. Goldstein, A S w a m Song for Remedies: Equitable Rdief in the
Burger Court, 13 HARV.C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1978).
272.
Federal Judge Anthony A. Alaimo ordered the Georgia Corrections Department to spend $60.2 million Wo improve, modernize and expand" the Georgia State
Prison in Reidsville and to "replace its dangerous overcrowded open dormitories
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erally thought t o be weighed and allocated by the legislative
and executive branches of government.
When the Supreme Court counsels judicial restraint, it has
in mind the panoply of these commentaries. But these observations deserve far more discussion because they represent fundamental choices respecting constitutional rights and remedies,
preferences that should not be made by sparring over the appropriate role of federal courts.273
Probably the most misplaced practice is that of accorhng
judicial deference to administrative expertise. The care and
custody of prisoners are relegated to correctional agencies
which are chronically understaffed and ill-trained.274Prison
administrators relinquish supervisory control t o guards who
deal with inmates intimately on a daily basis. As a result, subordinate custodial personnel, often undereducated and undertrained, exercise independent and sometimes capricious discretion in meting out severe disciplinary sanctions. As noted by
two commentators active in prison litigation:
Prisoners often have their privileges revoked, are denied the
right of access to counsel, sit in solitary or maximum security
or lose accrued "good time" on the basis of a single, unreviewed report of a guard. When the courts defer to administrative discretion, it is this guard to whom they delegate the
final word on reasonable prison practices. This is the central
evil in prison. It is not homosexuality, nor inadequate salaries, nor the cruelty and physical brutality of some of the
guards. The central evil is the unreviewed administrative
discretion granted to the poorly trained personnel who deal
directly with prisoners.275

Of course, the evaluation of penological objectives has, in
the first instance, been trusted to the wise judgment of prison

with single cells." Jingle Davis, Judge Pays Surprise Visit to Prison, and Is
J. & CONST.,June 19, 1990, at Dl, D6.
Pleased, ATLANTA
273.
Problems of judicial intrusion into the operations of large public institutions
are shared by other forms of institutional litigation, especially school desegregation
and mental health. See Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary
and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HAW. L. REV.465 (1980).
274.
PRESIDENT'S COMM'NO N LAWENFORCEMENT
TASKFORCEON CORRECTIONS,
AND ADMIN.OF JIJSTICE,TASKFORCEREPORT:CORREC~TIONS
93-99 (1967).
275.
Philip J. Hirschkop & Michael A. Millemann, The Unconstitutionality of
Prison Life, 55 VA. L. REV. 795, 811-12 (1969). See supra text accompanying note
120 for a prisoner's account that exemplifies the capricious nature of disciplinary
hearings.
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administrators "who are actually charged with and trained in
the running of the particular institution under examinat i ~ n . But
" ~ ~the
~ judiciary functions as the final arbiter. When
it fails to review and correct prison conditions, it legitimizes
the status quo and encourages abuse.277

B. Judicial Restraint-Separation

of Powers and Federalism

The Court has felt it important to respect the judgment of
prison officials. The Court is not only influenced by prison
officials' expertise, but also by the fear that serious separation
of powers issues would arise if the judiciary attempted to run
the prison^.^" Are courts displacing executive and legislative
power in a way that violates separation of powers? Prison litigation arises not so much because of a conflict of power, but
because the courts are asked t o fill a vacuum created by the
other branches of government. Judicial authority in prison litigation may be attributed to legislative inaction and executive
neglect. Only after it became clear that no relief would be voluntarily forthcoming were the courts dragged into prison re,~~
federal
~
courts' first seThe story of Holt v. S a r ~ e rthe
rious foray into state prisons, is representative of federal reluctance to intrude upon the states' legislative and executive prerogatives. Although the court found that the conditions at the
Arkansas prison were degrading, disgusting, and inhumane, for
many months the federal court left the remedies to state authorities. Only afker it was apparent that Arkansas was not
about to clean its own house did the court begin to issue detailed decrees. The federal court in Holt 11expressed respect for
Arkansas prerogatives and simply ordered officials "to make a
prompt and reasonable start toward eliminating" the unconstitutional condition^.^^' Even after a passage of three years,
the court of appeals held that Arkansas had not yet provided a
constitutional environment within the prisons.282
276.
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979).
277.
See Hirschkop & M i l l e r n a ~ ,supra note 275, at 835-37.
278.
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 548 (1979).
279.
See Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 273, at 495-96.
280.
300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969) (Holt 1); 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark.
1970), afd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971) (Holt 10.
281.
309 F. Supp. at 383.
282.
F i ~ e yv. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 200 (8th Cir. 1974).
The district court in Holt v. Hutto noted with approval the changing attitudes and
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Certainly, courts should hesitate before becoming involved
in continuous litigation and supervision of unfamiliar institutions, but the Constitution does not command that executive
and legislative officials be the sole or even final judges of prison conditions.283When the prisoners are totally dependent on
the government, some branch must be responsive to their
needs.
The existence of judicial authority to allocate public funds
raises special concerns. Judges demanding improvement of
prison facilities have been criticized as intruding into the domain of the legislature, whose province it is to determine the
appropriate allocation of limited resources. Criticism of judicial
meddling reflects in part the belief that the allocation of resources to correctional facilities is solely a legislative
choice.'" There is also uneasiness about the courts' ability t o
rank priorities.
But judicial enforcement of individual rights almost always
has as a necessary consequence the reallocation of public funds,
for that is the ultimate purpose of the 1itigatio1.1.~" Whether
it be the indigent criminal defendant's constitutional plea for
counsel at
or on
or for a free transcript2" or other specialized a s s i s t a n ~ ethe
~ ~ increased
~
expenditure of public funds is necessary.
Prison litigation involves a more obvious, direct expendi-

efforts of the legislative, executive, and administrative officials in Arkansas. 363 F.
Supp. 194, 198-200 (E.D. Ark. 1973), a f d in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Fimey v.
Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974). The Trusty system had
been abolished, and widespread unconstitutional conditions were no longer officially
sanctioned. The State had acquired law libraries for both institutions and had
retained a full-time physician to administer medical aid to the inmates. Id.
283.
Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 273, at 499.
284.
See Gerald E. Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV.
715, 788 (1978); Paul J. Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 949, 970-71 (1978).
285.
See Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 273, a t 506-10.
[Tlhe orders courts make in institutional cases will, almost inevitably,
have as their consequence the increased expenditure of public hnds. This
fact cannot serve to invalidate institutional litigation, however, because it
proves too much. For a judicial order in almost any case has either as its
aim or as its consequence the reallocation of resources. That is what
litigation is for,
Id. a t 507.
286.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
287.
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
288.
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
289.
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S.68 (1985).
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ture of public funds. Budgetary considerations about the costly
relief required to remedy constitutional violations are often
played out in the media. Perhaps, although never directly stated, at the core of the familiar cry of judicial meddling is the
belief that criminals have received their rightful punishment
and the judiciary should just leave it alone.
Fundamental questions of federal-state relations also arise
when federal courts issue decrees that regulate state institut i o n ~ Critics
. ~ ~ ~ fear too much federalism-that litigation involving state prisons has transgressed the rightful authority of
the federal judiciary t o act. Principles of federalism require a
proper respect for state functions and demand that the federal
government protect federal rights "in ways that will not unduly
interfere with the legitimate activities of the States."291
Like the decisions on separation of powers, the federal
bench has shown a strong sensitivity t o issues of federalism.
The comment by Judge Kane is revealing.
[Tlhere is, from the beginning of my assignment to this case
to the present time, a complete and utter distaste for having
to cross that Rubicon which separates the federal government
from the state government. . . . [Tlhe history which I have
recounted shows that this circuit and district have shown
great deference to prison officials, especially toward the Colorado State Penitentiary and the 150 cases that have been
filed from there in the past three years. Nevertheless, the
[prisoners] have presented substantial, oRen compelling, evidence of long existing and continuing constitutional violations. Except in fashioning the necessary relief, deference is
no longer possible.292

No one even minimally acquainted with prison litigation
can honestly suggest that the federal courts have been overeager t o interfere with the states' responsibility to administer
their prisons or to usurp the legislative or executive task of
running prisons.293But, "the [federal] courts have learned
See, eg., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled
290.
by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). But cf.
Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 273, at 501-06 (distinguishing these decisions from
most institutional cases).
Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
291.
292.
Ramos v. Lamm, 485 F. Supp. 122, 132 (D. Colo. 1979), affd in part, set
aside in part, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981).
293.
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 354 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in
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from repeated investigation and bitter experience that [federal]
judicial intervention is indispensable if constitutional dictates"
are going to be observed in our nation's prisons.294
"[Tlhe [wretched] inhumanity of conditions in American
prisons has been thrust upon the judicial con~cience."~~
Federal courts condemned entire state prison systems as unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend~nents.~~~
Chief Judge Johnson described in gruesome detail the horrendous conditions in the Alabama penal system.297 Judge
Holloway agreed with the lower court that the conditions in the
maximum-security unit of the Colorado State Penitentiary were
" ud5t for human habitation. "298 Chief Judge Pettine viewed
the "barbaric physical conditions" of Rhode Island's prison
system as "the ugly and shocking outward manifestations of a
deeper dysfunction, an attitude of cynicism, hopelessness, predatory ~ e ~ s h n e sand
s , callous indifference that appears to infect, to one degree or another, almost everyone who comes in
contact with the [prison]."299
Perhaps the most important schism on the Court is that a
majority of the justices assume state legislatures and prison
officials are sensitive to the requirements of the Constitution,soOwhile the minority point to the sorry history of state
prisons and believe that federal judicial intervention is "indispensable" t o preserve constitutional rights.301Despite limited
federal judicial pressure, slow but steady progress toward improving the constitutionality of the conditions of confinement in
our nation's prisons has occurred. For the most part, despite
their natural reluctance to see the changes come, prison admin-

the judgment).
294.
Id.
295.
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 684 (D.
Mass. 1973), afd, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Hall v. Inmates
of Suffolk County Jail, 419 U.S. 977 (1974).
296.
See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 353 n.1, 354 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment), for a list of the decisions that placed state prisons under court orders.
297.
Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 322-28 (M.D. Ala. 1976), afd as mdified
sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part on other
grounds sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (per curiam), and cert. dpnied
sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 438 U.S. 915 (1978).
298.
Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 567 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1041 (1981).
Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 984 (D. R.I. 1977), r e m a d d , 599
299.
F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1979).
300.
See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 352 (1981).
301.
See id. at 354, 358 n.7 (Breman, J., concurring in the judgment).
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istrators acknowledge the significant part the federal judiciary
has played in improving prisons.302Judged by the results of
the past two decades, the federal judiciary should be proud of
its "activist" role. For in the end, the merits do matter.303
VI. TOWARD
REACHING
A MUTUALACCOMMODATION
A central theme t o prison lore is "the fact that prisoners
have privileges, not rights."304This is personified by a sign
that was posted in the dining room of The Women's House of
Corrections in Chicago, Illinois:
Words were made to be spoken
Voices were made to be used
If you speak lightly, and also politely,
This privilege will not be abused.305

Both the Pe~sylvaniaand Auburn systems imposed a rule
of absolute silence at all times.306Although silence is no longer the norm, other everyday activities that we take for granted such as taking showers, receiving mail, laughing, smoking,
and even eating arrangements become matters of reward in
prison.
Early in the nineteenth century, a reaction against capital
and corporal punishment gave birth to the American penitentiary, an institution marveled at and lavishly praised. By the
1830s, the American penitentiary was world-famous. Yet, by
the middle of that century, it was a "conceded failure."307
Official reports proclaimed that "if human ingenuity were
asked to devise means by which the most profligate of men
might be rendered abandoned to the last degree of moral infa-

302.
See, eg., Davis, supra note 272, at Dl. Judge Anthony Alaimo's rulings
"brought sweeping changes to the state's maximum-security prison" a t Reidsville,
Georgia. Unit supervisor Ronald Fountain, "a 15 year veteran of the state prison,"
proudly commented that "[tlhis is probably the best-equipped institution anywhere."
Like others who worked at the state prison, "Mr. Fountain admitted he was initially reluctant to see the changes come." Id.
303.
Reidsville was "a grim, foreboding place then," noted Judge Alaimo. During
his surprise visit to Reidsville, "Judge Alaimo commented favorably on such improvements as the well-stocked law library, the modern medical and dental facilities" and the overall well-tended appearance of the giant prison facility. Id. a t D6.
304.
BURKHART,
supm note 119, at 144.
Id.
305.
306.
See supra text accompanying notes 16-53 for a discussion of the Pennsylvania and Auburn systems.
307.
supra note 64, a t 165.
BROCKWAY,
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my, nothing more effectual could be invented than the system
then in vogue."308
Today, as a t the beginning, the most serious social consequence of the prison system is the disintegration of the human
personality of those committed to its confines. The prisoners
suffer from what may be called a loss of autonomy as they are
constantly "subjected to a vast body of rules . . . which are designed to control their behavior in minute
The deprivation of autonomy represents a serious threat to their
self-image as adults. Regulation by a bureaucratic staff is seen
by prisoners as pointless authoritarianism designed to bring
them t o their knees. Public humiliation and enforced respect
for endless rules are all done in what is claimed to be the
inmates' best interests. While attempting to "reimpose the
subservience of youth,"1° the convicts are told to take their
medicine like adults. As the normative form of punishment,
imprisonment may not be much of an improvement over corporal punishment. Even public flogging did not contribute to the
degradation and disintegration of the human personality as
much as conditions do in our prisons today. The Quakers had
hoped to replace corporal punishment with solitary confinement, believing it more merciful, but convicts today face both
the demoralization of their spirit and wanton acts of physical
brutality.
Our prisons increase the already anti-social behavior of
their occupants. From the inmates' point of view, prison is a series of status degradation ceremonies. Prison life lends itself to
sexual perversions, general physical and moral disintegration,
and sporadic rebellion against the system. Almost everything
that could contribute to the debasement and demoralization of
the human personality has been done in prison.
The modern prison brings into play a n anomalous number
of disastrous influences. "Normal sociability is severely curtailed; self-assertion is practically denied; interesting work is
rarely provided; play and recreation, if existent a t all, are grotesquely inadequate.'"" Additionally, the normal sexual out-

3 08.
Id.
GRESHAM
M. SYKES, THE SOCIETYOF CAPTIVES:
A STUDYOF A M A X I ~ J M
309.
SECIJRITY
PRISON73 (1958). See generally id. at 63-83.
Id. at 76.
310.
HARRYE. BARNES,
THE STORYOF PUNISHMENT
173 (Patterson Smith 2d ed.
311.
1972).
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let is totally denied. The effects of all these factors are intensified by the regimentation and emotional cruelty in today's
conventional prison setting. As a consequence of the psychological effects inherent in our prisons, the inmates feel conscious
resentment toward the system and those who put them into it.
The result is not reformed prisoners, but rather persons who
are ready to avenge themselves on society.
The inmates in our prisons were, before being locked up,
citizens in our democracy. Most will be released. The period of
incarceration should be a time to encourage self-reliance and a
sense of responsibility. We should spark an interest in the best
that our democratic system has to offer. The Court should encourage prison administrators to produce a climate where it is
possible for the inmates to develop the traits society would like
to see them possess on release from the institution. Unfortunately, the Court has set its compass in a different direction.
Almost any restriction on the inmate may rationally be
related to "institutional security" and the "effective management of the detention f a ~ i l i t y . " ~" 'C
~O~S~~CU
lacking
O U Sfrom
~~
[the Supreme Court's perspective] is any meaningful consideration o f . . . the impact that restrictions may have on the inm a t e ~ . " ~The
' ~ Court is under an obligation "to examine the
actual effect" of the conditions of confinement and restrictions
upon the well-being of
Proper attention must also
be given to deprivations the inmates suffer. Ultimately, the
Court's task is to determine whether the restriction comports
with contemporary standards of human dignity.
For example, nowhere are dignity concerns more acutely
implicated than in the area of boddy integrity. Intrusive body
searches generate feelings of "degradation" and
Visual body cavity examinations engender a fear in inmates of
physical and sexual abuse by prison
Even though
governmental security interests are strongest with respect to
preventing dangerous weapons and contraband from entering
the prison, the Court should rightfully pause, and then pause

312.
Bell v. WoKsh, 441 U.S. 520, 567 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 563.
313.
314.
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 367 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in
the judgment).
315.
United States ex rel. WolFish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114, 147 (S.D.N.Y.
1977), a f f d in part, reu'd and remanded in part sub nom. Wolfish v. Levi, 573
F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1978), reu'd sub nom. Bell v. Wolfkh, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
316.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 577 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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again, when the net effect of its decision destroys any semblance of humanity that prisoners may hope to retain.
In Wolfish, inmates a t all Bureau of Prison facilities were
routinely required "to expose their body cavities for visual inspection as a part of a strip search conducted after every contact visit with a person from outside the in~titution."~'~
The
practice was so "unpleasant, embarrassing, and humiliating,"
and placed inmates in such a degrading position that it caused
some of them to forego visits with friends and family altogether.318 There was testimony that the procedures may leave
permanent, psychological scars.319
Admittedly, this practice made the Court pause. Neither
underestimating the degree to which these searches may invade the personal privacy of inmates, nor that on occasion they
may be conducted in an abusive fashion, the Court still permitted them. The Court's balancing tests2' to determine reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment gave way to the one
critical factor: "A detention facility is a unique place fraught
with serious security
The fact that only one incident of smuggling contraband in body cavities had been discovered was regarded as a testament to its effectiveness rather
than an argument against its r e a ~ o n a b l e n e s s . ~ ~ ~
There is no doubt that this practice perpetuated the degradation and dehumanization of the inmates. On this most serious issue, Justice Marshall charged that the majority ignored
the examination of the particular facts in favor of absolute
deference to the warden's interest in institutional securitySZ3 Did the Court examine the factual record with a view

317.
Id. a t 558. "If the inmate is a male, he must lift his genitals and bend
over to spread his buttocks for visual inspection. The vaginal and anal cavities of
female inmates also are visually inspected. The inmate is not touched by security
personnel a t any time during the visual search procedure." Id. a t 558 n.39.
318.
United States ex reZ. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. a t 147.
Id.
319.
320.
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search
against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts
must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which
it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it
is conducted.
Id.
321.
Id.
322.
See id.
323.
Id. a t 578-79 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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toward reaching a "mutual accommodation," or was it just
willing to wholeheartedly endorse the officials' raising the specter of security until they were shown conclusively to be wrong?
Were there less invasive methods of satisfying security
needs?324The dissenters examined the record and found far
less necessity for routine body cavity searches.
Before entering the visiting room, all visitors had their
packages searched by hand, metal detectors, and a fluoroscope.
To secrete contraband into a body cavity, an inmate would have
had to remove half of his one-piece, front-zippered jumpsuit,
while in plain view of guards who continuously monitored the
glass-enclosed visiting room.325Moreover, expert medical testimony suggested that inserting a n object into the rectum required time and opportunity not available in the visiting room,
and that it would be painful. Of equal importance, once inserted, visual inspection probably would not detect the object.326
Justice Marshall highlighted the bankruptcy of the majority's
analysis and found that indiscriminate searches are "so unnecessarily degrading that it 'shocks the conscience.' "=' Moreover, the lower court found that less restrictive alternatives
were available to ensure that contraband was not transferred
during visits.328 Metal detectors could be used to discover
weapons. In addition, the prisoners could be strip-searched,
their clothing examined, and they could be required to present
open hands and arms to reveal the absence of concealed obj e c t ~ .The
~ ~ dissenters
~
agreed with the district court that
these alternative procedures "amply satiscied] the demands of

324.
Justice Rehnquist's sole alternative was to abolish contact visits altogether.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 559 n.40. He expressed no view regarding the constitutionality
of prohibiting contact visits for pretrial detainees. In Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S.
576 (1984), the Court continued to reinforce its severe limitations on detainees,
holding that they may be denied contact visits with their spouses, children, relations, and friends. Id. at 585-89. Security concerns also permitted the majority to
brusquely reject the challenge to the jail's policy of refusing to permit the
detainees to observe searches of their cells. Id. at 589-91.
325.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. a t 577-78 (Marshall, J., dissenting). To h r t h e r security,
the locked lavatories were forbidden fo the inmates, and the visitors could only use
them with permission. The lavatories also contained a built-in window for inspection. Id. a t 578 n.18.
326.
Id. at 578.
327.
Id. at 578-79 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)).
328.
United States ex rel. WoEsh v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. a t 147-48 (finding even
anal searches ineffective).
329.
Id. at 147.
330.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. a t 576-79 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. a t 595 (Stevens,
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Humiliation had been an objective of the failed early
systems.331In order to maintain silence in the movement of
large numbers of inmates about prisons, the Auburn system
had subjected prisoners to the degradation of the lockstep. Prisoners were out of step with society, and their physical movements were to be made as graceless as possible. Each prisoner
moved silently, in a shuffle, his "right arm outstretched with
the hand on the right shoulder of the man in front of him.''332
Prisoners were "not permitted to hold their heads up, as would
befit free men."333 With their heads turned to the right, and
their eyes cast downward as they shuffled forward, they were
constantly reminded of their low estate.334
We should reject the past and preserve human dignity in
prison. Current prison practices that blithely contribute to the
prisoners' virtual degradation by design or neglect are to be
condemned. It is difficult to believe that the reason for the
visual body cavity search is solely for security and not also to
purposefully demoralize and humiliate the inmate.
The Court's policy has allowed not only degradation but
also deprivation of the very elements needed to reform the
prisoner. The "hands-off' doctrine had failed the prisoners by
abdicating jurisdiction. The deferential model likewise fails by
abandoning the Court's responsibility.
O'Lone u. Estate of S h a b a ~ highlights
z~~~
the substitution
of judicial rhetoric for any meaningful scrutiny of prisoners'
constitutional claims. The Court's analytical framework completely prevented the inmates from attending the central religious service of their Muslim faith. Rather than trying to reach
a mutual accommodation, the Court's "reasonableness" standard became nothing more than "reflexive deference to prison
officials."336
"Religion represents a rich resource in the moral and spiri-

J., dissenting). Justice Powell joined the majority except with respect to body-cavity
searches. He stated that the serious intrusion on one's privacy occasioned by anal
and genital searches required "at least some level of cause, such as a reasonable
suspicion." Id. at 563 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
331.
HARRYE. BARNES& NEGLEYK. TEETERS,NEW HORIZONS
IN CRIMINOLOGY
351 (3d ed. 1959).
ATTICA,supra note 38, at 10.
332.
Id. at 11.
333.
334.
Id.
335.
482 U.S. 342 (1987); see supra text accompanying notes 248-58 for a discussion of O'Lone.
336.
O'hne, 482 US. at 367 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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tual regeneration of
and in prison it serves a rehabilitative function. The Quakers, who began the reform
movement, believed in the reformation of the inmate's spirit
through religious study and repentance. Although all contact
with fellow prisoners and community was prevented, prisoners
in the Pennsylvania system were given religious instruction by
ministers. Even the stern Auburn system applied the accepted
doctrine that criminals in prison should be provided with religious services.338Religion provides the means to spiritual recovery by which "the inmate may reclaim his dignity and reassert his i n d i ~ i d u a l i t y . " ~ ~ ~
The Ozone Court's task was to frame society's values, giving the fullest measure of constitutional protections consistent
with institutional needs. Muslim inmates are permitted to take
part in Jumu'ah throughout the entire federal prison system.
Moreover, the Leesburg state prisoners had, for five years, been
permitted to participate in the Jumu'ah without creating any
threats to security or to the safety of the institution.340 Considering Leesburg's experience, the standard federal practice,
and given the institution's responsibility to provide Muslims
with a "reasonable opportunity of pursuing [their] faith comparable to the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere
to conventional religious preceptsY4l surely the Court could
have found a mutual accommodation to satisfy all needs. The
Muslim prisoners had proposed plausible alternatives that
federal prisons and other courts, in strikingly similar circumstances, had accepted.34"

337.
AMERICAN
CORRECTIONAL
ASS'N, MANUALOF CORRECTIONAL
STANDARDS
at
xxi (3d ed. 1966) (preamble principle XVII).
338.
See ROTHMAN,supra note 2, at 104.
Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
339.
O'hne, 482 U.S. a t 366 (&eman, J., dissenting).
340.
Cruz v. Betd, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (per curiam).
341.
342.
O'hne, 482 U.S. a t 361, 363-67 (Breman, J., dissenting). The prisoners
alternatively proposed that Muslim inmates "be assigned to a n alternative inside
work detail on Friday," id. a t 363; that they "be assigned to work details inside
the main building on a regular basis," id. at 364; that they "be assigned to Saturday or Sunday work details," id. a t 365 (this would allow them to make up time
lost by attending Jumu'ah on Friday); or that minimum-security inmates "be assigned to jobs either in the Farm building or in its immediate vicinity," id. at 36566 & n.6 (this would avoid increasing congestion a t the main gate, a concern underlying the no-return policy).
"Muslim inmates are able to participate in Jumu'ah throughout the entire federal prison system." Id. at 362. Federal Bureau of Prisons regulations and directives require that "the more central the religious activity is to the tenets of the
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The Pennsylvania advocates were convinced that separating the convicts from all evil influences and corrupt companions was the key to their rehabilitation. To f a l l this goal,
they severed every tie between the prisoners and the community and sought to block out reports of outside events.343Thus
they were kept in complete isolation. The Auburn system was
as devoted as Pennsylvania to the idea of isolating the prisoners from each other and from the- outside world. The "silent
system" contemplated a n end to free communication within the
penitentiary. The prisoners were rarely allowed to communicate or visit with their families.344The prisoner "was taught
to consider himself dead to all without the prison
Today's theory is totally contrary to the early view. Authorities that deal closely with penal reform counsel correctional
institutions "to maximize visiting opportunities for inm a t e ~ . "The
~ ~ ~decrease of recichvism and the subsequent
reentry of the inmate into society may well depend upon his
maintaining ties to the community. Of equal importance to the
inmate and his relatives is that the family unit remain intact.
Admittedly, there may be valid reasons to believe that
visitation rights have been abused in a particular case, and
prison officials should take reasonable steps to investigate and
to .correct that situation. The inmates in Kentucky Department
of Corrections v. Thompson, however, did not ask for unfettered
visitation, but merely for rudimentary procedural safeguards
against retaliatory or arbitrary denial of visits from family and
The Thompson Court's answer was that visits could be
denied without justification. The Court gave correctional authorities unbridled discretion over the "basic human need" of
inmate's religious faith, the greater the presumption is for relieving the inmate
from the institution program or assignment." Id. a t 362 (citing respondent's brief a t
8a). Furthermore, the Chaplain Director of the Bureau stated that "[iln those institutions where the outside work details contain Islamic inmates, they are permitted access to the inside of the institution to attend the Jumu-ah." Id. a t 362 (citing respondent's brief at la).
ROTHMAN, supra note 2, a t 94-95. Interestingly, in the early English and
343.
American jails, widespread visitation practices were permitted. See Leverson, supra
note 16, a t 413-15.
344.
ROTHMAN,supra note 2, a t 94-95.
345.
Id. at 95.
FEDERAL
STANDARDS
FOR PRISONSAND JAILS
9 12.12 (US.Dep't of Justice
346.
1980); see also Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 468 n.4
(1989) (citing additional authorities).
347.
Thompson, 490 U.S. at 475 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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the prisoner to see his family and friends.348Consequently,
today, visitation remains merely a privilege.349
The continued necessity for correctional personnel to exercise broad discretion in maintaining order and security cannot
be questioned. Respect for state institutions and administrative
guidance is relevant in prison litigation. But, the slow pace of
prison litigation and the substantial guidance sought and secured from correctional officials in framing adequate procedures manifest sufficient deference to the states and prison
administration^.^^^ The fundamental question is not that of
respect, but of who should make the final determination about
the conditions our fellow citizens face while incarcerated. To
permit the states and prison authorities to do so is to abdicate
federal judicial responsibility.
The Supreme Court, by failing to act, legitimizes the status
quo. By setting unrealistic barriers for review of Eighth
Amendment rights, the Court discourages constitutional inquiry and encourages abuse.351 The gravamen of the Eighth
Amendment is the effect upon the imprisoned. Humane considerations and constitutional requirements are not to be measured by the public fisc. Charged with the duty of enforcing the
Constitution, the federal courts must continue t o be available
to force the states to correct their unconstitutional prison conditions. If Wilson's deliberate indifference theory is employed t o
insulate judicial review because conscientious prison administrators seek t o improve their facilities, even while state legislatures refuse to spend scarce tax dollars t o bring conditions in
outdated prisons up to minimally acceptable s t a n d a r d ~ , 3 ~ ~
348.
Id. at 466.
349.
See supra text accompanying notes 263-68 for a discussion of Thompson. In
prison, even the quantity of sugar or milk in coffee is a privilege of some consequence:
"I went to get sugar for my oatmeal," Marlene Riffert says. "I took a
spoonfbl and then the matron came up and took my bowl away and
threw the cereal in the garbage. I was so shocked, I didn't say anything,
I just looked at her. She said, You know you already used sugar in your
coffee.' I was given three nights' early bed." Marlene had violated a sacrosanct rule a t the House of Correction in Philadelphia: she attempted to
use sugar in her coffee and on her cereal a t breakfast. Her option was
one or the other, not both.
BIJHKHART,
supra note 119, a t 144-45.
350.
Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 273, at 506.
351.
See Hirschkop & Millemam, supra note 275, at 835-37.
352.
See Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2331 (1991) (White, J., concurring in
the judgment).
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then imprisonment will be an open door for cruelty and neglect.
But, if deliberate indifference may be satisfied by showing a
legislative failure to reevaluate its correctional policy and corr e d some of its worst penal systems, then it will not impede
prison reform. The history of prison litigation attests to this
assertion.
When evaluating whether prison conditions pass constitutional muster, the touchstone should be the actual effect upon
the well-being of the imprisoned. In performing this responsibility, the courts must carefully scrutinize the challenged condition, applying realistic yet humane standards.353The cumulative impact of the conditions of incarceration that threaten the
physical and emotional health of the inmates, and not the budget, should determine whether the conditions violate the Constit~tion.~~~
The model the Court uses and its standard of review for
prison regulations also have fundamental consequences. When
the standard may be satisfied by merely showing a "'logical
connection' between the regulation and any legitimate
penological concern perceived by a cautious warden," then "it is
virtually meaningle~s."~"A prisoner's constitutional rights
should not be disregarded whenever the warden can articulate
a plausible security concern.35"
It is ironic that although this Article argues for a greater
judicial role, it is the Supreme Court, as final arbiter, that has
continuously impeded the efforts of the lower federal courts to

353.
, concurring in
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 361 (1981) ( B r e ~ a n J.,
the judgment).
354.
1n Rhodes, Justice Brennan noted:
The court must examine the effect upon inmates of the condition of the
physical plant (lighting, heat, plumbing, ventilation, living space, noise
levels, recreation space); sanitation (control of vermin and insects, food
preparation, medical facilities, lavatories and showers, clean places for
eating, sleeping, and working); safety (protection from violent, deranged,
or diseased inmates, fire protection, emergency evacuation); inmate needs
and services (clothing, nutrition, bedding, medical, dental, and mental
health care, visitation time, exercise and recreation, educational and rehabilitative programming); and staffing (trained and adequate guards and
other staff, avoidance of placing inmates in positions of authority over
other inmates).
452 U.S. a t 364 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
355
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 100 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
356
Id. at 100-01.
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further prison reform. If the Court is sincere in its proclamation that prison walls are not barriers separating inmates from
constitutional protections:57 then it must demand more of
the warden. Considerations of security and administrative
expense are factors to weigh, but are not necessarily dispositive. A limitation on constitutional rights requires more than a
"reflexive deference to prison official^."^" The basic premise
is that prisoners, as members of society, retain constitutional
rights that limit the exercise of official authority aimed against
them.359An approach more sensitive to the retained rights of
the inmate is required. An open mind to alternative methods of
accommodating constitutional concerns, with a view that any
limitation on freedom should be no greater than absolutely
necessary to accomplish the correctional needs, is more in accord with the Court's declared commitment.360Although the
regulation may be "reasonable," there may be better alternatives.
Regulations that unnecessarily degrade the prisoner, limit
his access to family and friends, restrict his desire to worship,
and frustrate his ability to gain a modicum of self-respect, ill
prepare him for his return to society. At a minimum, the prisoner retains the right to be treated with human dignity. When
this right is no greater than the warden chooses to permit,
then surely the prisoner is still not much better than the past
century description of him as "the slave of the State."361

357.
Turner, 482 U.S. at 84.
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 367 (1987) (Brennan, J., dis358.
senting).
359.
Id. a t 355.
360.
See Part I of Justice Brennan's dissent in n o n e , 482 U.S. a t 3.5449
( B r e ~ a n ,J., dissenting). Judge Kaufman in Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d
1015, 1033 (2d Cir. 1985), believed that the prison official must show that "a particular restriction is necessary to further an important governmental interest,
and . . . the limitations on freedoms occasioned by the restriction are no greater
than necessary to effectuate the governmental objective involved." Id. The degree of
scrutiny should depend upon "the nature of the right being asserted by prisoners,
the type of activity in which they seek to engage, and whether the challenged
restriction works a total deprivation (as opposed to a mere limitation) on the exercise of that right." Id.
Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871). Our prison
361.
population is predominantly black, and black prisoners, with their increased sensitivity to black slave history, have perceived the close analogy between imprisonment and slavery. See Herman Schwartz, Prisoner's Rights: Some Hopes and RealiEARLWARRENCONFERENCE
ON ADVOCACY
IN THE
ties, in W J A L CHIEF JIJSTICE
UNITEDSTATES,A PROGRAM
FOR PRISONREFORM56 (1972).

